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ABSTRACT
With the onset of globalisation, the maritime industry has been affected by
sweeping changes which have had a profound effect on the trade patterns,
technology and organisations involved in the sector.  These changes have primarily
affected shipping lines initially, and by extension, the ports that serve them.
The aim of this paper is to determine the extent of the effects of these changes on
the commercial environment in which the container terminal operates, examine the
implications of these changes for the port of Kingston, and to determine if the port
can remain a competitive transhipment centre in the face of these changes.
This exercise will be conducted by examining the nature of the global trends which
are developing, establishing the present situation of the port with respect to its
institutions, domestic and transhipment container traffic, and, with the use of a
SWOT analysis, determine the peculiar characteristics of the port and what they
reflect about the port’s readiness to cope with its changing environment.
Based on these findings, strategies will be proposed to consolidate Kingston’s
position as a premier transhipment hub port for the Caribbean region by building on
its strengths, overcoming its weaknesses, dealing with threats and capitalising on
opportunities.
This thesis then concludes that based upon an analysis of Kingston’s
circumstances, it possesses all the necessary qualities to meet the challenges
brought on by the onset of globalisation, but that there are certain critical actions
that need to be taken if it is to successfully maintain its role as the key transhipment
hub centre of the Caribbean region.
KEYWORDS: Globalisation, Transhipment hub, SWOT analysis, Port competition.
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11 INTRODUCTION
The Port of Kingston is set upon the seventh largest natural deep water harbour in
the world, containing approximately 20 square kilometres of navigable water
approached by a clearly marked 244 metre access channel.  This is just one of the
several natural advantages this facility has, which serves to enhance its position as
the leading transhipment centre for the Caribbean and Latin America, a fact which
will be underscored during the course of this treatise.  Besides its harbour, Kingston
also has the good fortune of sitting astride two of the world’s major trade routes,
another fact which has not been lost on the major international shipping lines that
utilise its facilities.  Kingston has sought to capitalise on these advantages by
developing its facilities so as to offer these lines ample and uncongested terminal
capacity, cargo handling systems and procedures which are in line with international
standards, and berths which can accept the largest vessels that can reasonably be
expected to serve the region.  After more than twenty years in the transhipment
business, the terminal managers of the Kingston Container Terminal can
legitimately claim to be the most experienced in the Caribbean, and the steady
growth of the volumes handled by the port, which will also be discussed in further
detail later on, attests to their continued competence.
With all that the port has to recommend it however, in recent times there have been
dark clouds on its horizon, in the form of developments in the international maritime
industry.  With the onset of the phenomenon called globalisation, the port of
Kingston has found itself playing in an entirely new ballgame for ever-increasing
stakes.  That globalisation should affect the maritime industry, which by its very
nature is international, is a foregone conclusion.
2As a matter of fact, according to columnist Martin Henry (Jamaica Gleaner,1999)
quoting from the 1999 UNDP Human Development Report:
Globalisation began when little sailing ships set out from European ports in
the 15th century to explore, and colonise a round world.  The supremacy of
European technology, culture and ideas has increasingly bound the peoples
of the world together over the last 500 years, a period of human history
without parallel or precedent.  But, the present era has distinctive features:
shrinking space, shrinking time, and disappearing borders are linking
people’s lives more deeply, more intensely, more immediately than ever
before.  Globalisation...is the growing inter-dependence of the world’s
people...a process integrating not just the economy but culture, technology
and governance.  People everywhere are becoming connected - affected by
events in the far corners of the world.  There are new markets, new tools,
new actors and new rules.
The manner in which globalisation has manifested itself has served to
fundamentally change some of the precepts upon which the business of the
maritime industry is conducted.  Information and communications technology have
already reduced the world to essentially a global village, and these improvements
have lent themselves to facilitating the growth of shipping lines from regional
carriers into truly global operators. With their growth, comes also an increase in
their demands on those that serve them, thus ports have subsequently come under
tremendous pressure to keep pace.  Thus the transfer of technical, financial and
human resources have become necessary and commonplace, even in the realm of
ports, which up to this point were bastions of sovereignty governed by an attitude of
‘take it or leave it’ in terms of service orientation.
3As the maritime industry is swept up in the relentless demands for greater
economies of scale, which bring about truly global players, the competition for cargo
is no longer a regional matter, but rather one which has assumed international
overtones.  The effect of shrinking space, shrinking time and disappearing borders
brought about by globalisation has indeed brought about new markets, tools, actors
and rules, which are all now combining to subject the port of Kingston to pressures
it had never experienced before, and which it will be hard pressed to survive.
The author will attempt during the course of this paper to outline the exact nature of
the changes brought about in the maritime industry by the phenomenon of
globalisation, outline the situation in the port of Kingston and show how these
changes have impacted on it, and finally, with the use of a SWOT analysis,
determine the options open to the port as a recourse for coping with the effects of
globalisation on its business environment.
4Figure 1.  Map of Jamaica's Strategic Location
Source: Port Authority, 1997
5CHAPTER 2 GLOBAL TRENDS IN SHIPPING
2.1 CHANGES IN PATTERNS OF TRADE
According to Martin Stopford in his book Maritime Economics, the liner shipping
trade routes of the maritime industry are basically divided into three groups, namely
the East-West trades, the North-South trades and the Intra regional trades.
2.1.1 East-West Trades
The East-West trades account for 44% of the cargo and circle the globe in the
Northern Hemisphere, linking the major industrial centres of North America,
Western Europe and Asia.  These trades can be further broken down into three
subcategories, namely the trans-Pacific, trans-Atlantic, and Western Europe to Far
East trades.
The trans-Pacific is the biggest deep sea liner route, trading between North America
and the Far East with 7.5 million TEU of traffic representing 22% of the world total.
Operating from North American ports on the East, Gulf and West coasts to the
industrial centres of Japan and the Far East, these services employ the biggest
ships i.e.  post-Panamax vessels of over 4000 TEU capacity.  They are able to do
this partly due to the use of double stack landbridge trains to connect the US East
and West coasts, therefore avoiding the necessity of a Panama Canal transit.
6The North Atlantic trade was however the first to develop, and linked the industrial
centres of East Coast North America (Boston, New York; Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Wilmington, Charleston and Hampton Roads) and Canada (Halifax and Montreal) to
those of Western Europe (Gothenburg, Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Antwerp,
Rotterdam, Felixstowe and Le Havre).  In the mid 1990’s this trade averaged 3
million TEU which accounted for 8% of world container trade.
The Western Europe to Far East trade covered the trade from North Europe,
stretching from Sweden to St. Nazaire in France to the Far East comprising of West
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and
Japan.
As these three trade routes matured, the next logical development was the
formation of the round the world service.  By following the three main arterial routes,
the service went westbound after calling at the UK and North European ports,
proceeded down the East Coast North America (ECNA) through the Panama Canal
to the West Coast North America (WCNA), then across to Japan and the Far East
before going through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean.
2.1.2 North-South Trades
The second major grouping is the North-South liner routes, which covers the trade
between the industrial centres of Europe, North America and the Far East and the
developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Australasia.  In addition, there is
an extensive network of services between the smaller economies, especially those
of the Southern Hemisphere.  These trades are very different in character from
those of the East-West in that although the cargo volumes are much lower
(accounting for only 22% of cargo volume), the fact that there are many more ports
to visit and less efficient port itineraries results in significantly more business being
generated than the cargo volume suggests.  There also remains a considerable
amount of breakbulk cargo which cannot be efficiently containerised, so the liner
services have to be more varied.  Vessels in this trade have been increasing in
average size, as the introduction of the post-Panamax megaliners into the East-
7West trades have displaced the previously used third generation Panamax vessels
into these trades.
2.1.3 Intra regional Trades
Finally, the Intra regional trades and feeder services comprise the last category.
These are essentially short sea trades, which have developed rapidly as a result of
operators on the major trade routes increasingly opting for the hub and spoke
system of distribution.  The vessels in this trade have always been relatively small,
but have also been gradually increasing in size.
2.1.4 Relevance to Kingston
Against this background, the Port of Kingston, by virtue of its geographical location
in the virtual centre of the Caribbean Sea just 51 kilometres NNW of the Panama
Canal, finds itself positioned close to the main shipping lanes which transit the
canal.  With respect to the above mentioned liner trade routes, Kingston has the
following specific trade lanes running past its front door :
NORTH - SOUTH
Europe - West Coast South America
ECNA - West Coast South America (WCSA)
ECNA - North Coast South America (NCSA)
ECNA - East Coast South America (ECSA)
US Gulf Coast - WCSA
US Gulf Coast - NCSA
US Gulf Coast - ECSA
8EAST-WEST
Europe - WCNA
Far East - ECNA
Far East - East Coast South America
In addition to the above, it is also advisable that traffic destined from Europe/North
America/Far East to the East Coasts of Mexico and Central America, and the wider
Caribbean, be taken into consideration as possible trade routes.
As can be seen, the North-South trade routes have particular importance to
Kingston, especially in light of the fact that Europe-WCNA and Far East-ECNA have
largely ceased to use the Panama Canal due to the combination of intermodal
economics and fourth generation (post-Panamax) containerships.  Intra regional
trade is of course also important.
Besides these subtle but significant changes in the nature of the trade routes, of
note is the change in the trade itself, in terms of volume and type.  According to
Ocean Shipping Consultants, world containerised and general cargo trade
increased by 52% to 1215mt between 1980-1996.  Containerised cargoes increased
their share from 18.5% to 52% over the same period.  For the Americas, container
port throughput increased by 93% to 33.23 million TEU between 1985-1996.  Now,
Kingston’s market has been defined as including the Caribbean, US Southern and
Eastern ports, and the Atlantic coasts of Central America, Columbia, and
Venezuela.  This makes the regional market for Kingston stand at 9.6 million TEU in
1996, which was a 260% increase over 1985.  Of this regional market, the
Caribbean accounted for 35%, the US ports for 37%, Central American ports for
22% and Columbia/Venezuela for 6%.  Over this period, growth has been most
rapid in Central American, Venezuelan and Colombian ports, averaging 400%
(compared to 98% for the Caribbean) as a result of not only increased trade, but
also dramatic increases in containerisation.
Should this trend continue, then global general cargo and containerised trade is to
increase by a further 21% by the year 2000.  Containerised traffic is also expected
9to steadily increase its share from 52% to 60%.  By the year 2005, total general
cargo traffic is expected to grow by 21-34% to between 1786 -1978mt, of which
69% will be containerised.  For the Americas, this means a growth in container port
throughput to 43 million TEU by year 2000 and 56 million TEU by 2005.  The
Kingston regional port market is expected to grow to 13 million TEU by 2000 and
further to 18 million TEU by 2005.  All ports within the region are expected to
experience increased container traffic, but the Caribbean is expected to increase its
market share to 36% by 2000 and 38% by 2005.
Against this backdrop of well established trade patterns and strong growth
anticipated in both trade volumes and levels of containerisation, it seems relatively
safe to assume that the global trends of these trade patterns will not overtly affect
the Port of Kingston adversely.
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2.2 CHANGES IN LINER SHIPPING ORGANISATION
Since the advent of liner shipping, shipping managers have sought to control
market forces in a variety of ways.  These methods included, at one time or
another, seeking to fix prices for the whole trade, using a range of complex
arrangements such as loyalty rebates, commodity discounts, service agreements
and other strategies designed to blend price fixing with a degree of flexibility.
Another way sought to control capacity, by fixing trade shares so as to artificially
protect each company’s market share.  The first system which developed along
these lines was that of the Conference system, which saw major shipping lines
band together on certain trade routes in order to achieve stability in this volatile
industry by trying to adjust the supply of vessel capacity to the demands of the
market, while at the same time maintaining acceptable service standards.  This
system grew in popularity since its inception in 1875 on the East India tea trade
from Calcutta to the UK to the point that presently there are approximately 350
conferences in force throughout the world.
Due to practices such as establishing agreements governing freight rates, market
share, cargo carrying capacity, port rotation and sometimes even membership, liner
conferences have often been accused of ’price fixing’ and as such been branded as
cartels.  As a result of this, conferences have a long history of having their practices
come under intense scrutiny.  Beginning in 1909 in the UK with “the Royal
Commission on Shipping Rings” and lately with the US Federal Maritime
Commission, EU’s  DG.IV and the emerging Shanghai Shipping Exchange,
authorities have tried to regulate the various agreements existing between shipping
lines.  This attention has had a two-fold effect on the conference system, which is to
render it lawful in the face of accusations that they were in breach of monopoly anti
trust principles, while at the same time undermining their influence in the evolving
maritime industry.
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Despite their waning influence, liner conferences in both their “open” (unrestricted
membership) and “closed” (restricted membership) forms still account for some 50-
60% of lines involved in certain trades e.g.  Far East Freight Conference (FEFC)
and the Trans Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA).  However, due to their
continued persecution by politicians, shippers councils and even members
themselves, conferences have been giving way to shipping consortia, alliances and
mergers in terms of importance as shipping lines seek to control their own destiny.
With conferences becoming relegated to forums for discussion rather than decision
making, consortia, alliances and groups have come to the forefront to champion the
cause of the shipping lines.  The major ones presently in force are (Containerisation
Intl,1998b):
• The Global Alliance - comprised of Hyundai, MOL, NOL/APL
• The Grand Alliance - comprised of Hapag-Lloyd,MISC,NYK,OOCL,P&O Nedlloyd
• The United Alliance - Hanjin, DSR-Senator, Cho Yang, UASC
• COSCO / K-Line / Yangming
• Maersk / Sea-Land
• Canmar / CAST / Contship / Ivarans / Lykes
• CMA / CGM / NSCSA
 
 Table 1 details the fleet size, market share, etc. of these consortia.  It should be
noted that between them, these consortia control upwards of 50% of the world’s
container traffic, which illustrates their growing power.
12
 
 POSITION  GROUP  TEU
CAPACITY
 % OF WORLD
FLEET
 1  GRAND ALLIANCE:
 P&O Nedlloyd, HL, NYK,
OOCL/MISC
 
 1,212,048  16.0
 2  GLOBAL ALLIANCE:
 Hyundai, MOL, NOL/APL
 
 
 713,161  9.4
 3  K-Line, COSCO, Yang Ming
 
 
 
 700,161  9.2
 4  Maersk/Sea-Land
 
 
 
 659,374  8.7
 5  UNITED ALLIANCE:
 Hanjin, DSR-Senator, Cho Yang,
UASC
 
 507,122  6.7
 6  Canmar, CAST, Contship,
Ivarans, Lykes
 
 
 213,894  2.8
 7  CMA, CGM, NSCSA
 
 
 
 211,263  2.8
  TOTALS  4,217,023  55.6
 
 Table 1.  Main Alliance / Consortia (1998)
 Source:  Containerisation Intl. 1998b
13
 Outside of the above, further alliances have been formed on specific trade routes.
With respect to Kingston, these alliances are as follows:
• New Caribbean Service (NCS) - P&O Nedlloyd, Hamburg-Sud, CGM, Hapag
Lloyd, Harrison Lines
• EUROSAL - P&O Nedlloyd, Hamburg-Sud, Hapag Lloyd, CSAV, FMG
• ZIAS - ZIM, Montemare
 Between them, these three alliances have been responsible for transhipping some
125,000 containers through Kingston, and are, as such, important customers
(PAJ,1997,43).  However, there is an element of this trend towards formation of
alliances that poses a real threat for ports, in that, in their drive for cost savings and
operational efficiencies, these lines rationalise several of their administrative and
operational procedures, such as or including vessel allocation, schedules, feeder
networks, tariffs and most importantly for us, terminals, depots and ports of call.
 
 In essence the danger posed by formation or switching of alliances by carriers is
that the port runs the risk of losing a line’s business altogether if a decision is taken
to patronise a competing port with which a member of the alliance already has
significant ties.  As a case in point, in November of 1993 Maersk lines pulled out of
Kingston in order to re-establish its operations on the Sea-Land terminal in Rio
Haina, Santo Domingo as part of its developing partnership with Sea-Land.  This
loss of some 5,000 containers per annum (in addition to the line’s connections)
proved a hard blow for the port, but this loss was further compounded when in May
1998 as part of further consolidation of its alliance with Maersk, Sea-Land Services
also stopped calling Kingston after 25 years and instead diverted all its vessels to
Rio Haina.  The traffic lost to the port was approximately 12,000 containers per
annum, and it is sobering to know that presently Sea-Land is shipping about
160,000 containers through the Rio Haina yearly, of which approximately
50,000TEU are transhipments (OSC,1997,12).  However, of greater significance
was the shocking realisation that the decision taken was totally beyond the control
of the port and that there were forces at work in the maritime industry that they were
virtually powerless to influence.
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 Some measure of comfort can however be taken from the realisation that this
phenomenon works both ways.  In at least two instances, Kingston has benefited
from an influx of new business as a result of the formation of liner alliances.  The
ZIAS service brought Multimare to the port and this has resulted in over 21,000
containers handled in 1997 (PAJ,1997,38), while the NCS consortia repositioned
one of its services from Ponce, Puerto Rico to Kingston resulting in an additional
25,000 TEUs annually (C. Donaldson,1998).
 
 Bearing these experiences in mind, the port would be well advised to take stock of
its situation and take action accordingly.  Table 2 gives a complete listing of the
carriers that presently call the port (PAJ,1997,55) while table 3 lists the world’s top
carriers (Containerisation Intl Yearbook,1999).
 
 From this list, a shortlist of top operators presently serving the Caribbean and Latin
America can be prepared, which include the following :
 
• P&O Nedlloyd
• Evergreen
• Maersk/Sea-Land
• NYK
• MOSK
• CMA/CGM
• ZIM
• Canmar
• K-Line
• Hapag Lloyd
• Mediterranean Shipping
Of the remainder, the following have expressed their intention to enter the market,
either individually, or through an alliance :
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• DSR-Senator, Hanjin, UASC (members of United alliance)
• APL/NOL and HMM (members of Global alliance)
• OOCL (member of Grand alliance)
• COSCO, Yangming (members of the same alliance)
 
 Against this background, the port could effectively target these major lines, as they
are already affiliated with lines that presently either call Kingston or as yet have no
firm ties in the region (IMS,1998b,52).
 
 
 RANK  CARRIER  SLOTS DEPLOYED
   
 1  Maersk  232,257
 2  Evergreen  228,248
 3  P&O Nedlloyd  221,531
 4  Sea-Land  215,154
 5  COSCO  201,573
 6  Hanjin  174,546
 7  Neptune Orient Lines / APL  165,582
 8  Mediterranean Shipping Line  154,185
 9  NYK / TSK  128,154
 10  Mitsui - OSK  128,154
 11  Hyundai Merchant Marine  112,958
 12  Zim Isreal Navigation  98,086
 13  Yangming Marine Transport  96,145
 14  CMA - CGM  89,658
 15  OOCL  85,940
 16  CP Ships  85,016
 17  K - Line  84,198
 18  Hapag Lloyd Container Line  73,372
 19  Cho Yang Shipping  55,882
 20  SCL  51,002
   
 TOTAL   2,669,210
 Total Fleet   5,265,745
 % Top 20   50.7%
 
 Table 2.  Top 20 Container Service Operators by slots deployed (1997)
 Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 1998
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 MAINLINERS  REGIONAL  FEEDERS
 Zim Container Service  Zim Container Service
(Gulf/Mexico)
 Zim Container Service
(Caribbean)
 Evergreen (RTW west)  Evergreen
(Caribbean/Miami)
 Evergreen (Caribbean)
 P&O Nedlloyd (NCS-
Eurosal))
 P&O Nedlloyd
(ECSA/Gulf)
 P&O Nedlloyd (Inter-
Caribbean)
 Hapag Lloyd (NCS-
Eurosal)
 Hapag Lloyd  Hapag Lloyd
 FMG (NCS -Eurosal)  FMG (Caribbean)  Ivaran
 Harrison (Eurosal)  Lykes  Harrison
 Transnave (Eurosal  Cagema  Florida SVC
 Suda America Vapores -
CSAV (Eurosal)
 Pan American
Independent
 
 Zim Inter America Service
(ZIAS)
 Crowley American
Transport
 
 Jamaica Producers Line  Jamaica Producers Line  
 Hamburg SUD/Laser Line  Seaboard Line  
 Columbus Line  Seafreight Lines  
 Safmarine  Melfi Marine  
 Pacena  Kirk Line  
 Blue Star Pace  Techmarine Lines  
  Coral Container Lines  
  Kent Line  
 
 Table 3.  Listing of Carriers Presently Calling Kingston
 Source: Port Authority of Jamaica, 1997
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 2.3 EFFECT OF PORT COMPETITION
 
 According to Ocean Shipping Consultants (OSC), in 1981 only 6 of the 26 container
handling ports in the region were equipped with gantry cranes, and of these 6, only
3 had water depth greater than 10 metres, of which one was Kingston.  By 1996,
the number of container handling ports had increased to 52, the number of
specialised container terminals had grown to 26, and the number of berths with
depths exceeding 10 meters had increased to 32 (table 4).  These statistics serve to
illustrate the point that the port of Kingston faces growing competition from other
regional ports, several of which are being developed specifically with the regional
transhipment market in mind.  These facilities (to name the most prominent) are
being developed in the following locations, and will be discussed in greater detail in
section 5.4.1 as part of a SWOT analysis of Kingston’s situation:
 
• Panama - Manzanillo, Coco Solo, Christobal and Balboa
• Dominican Republic - Rio Haina
• Bahamas - Freeport
• USA - Miami and Port Everglades
 
 Depth  Terminals with Gantry
cranes
 Terminals without
Gantry cranes
 Totals
  ‘81  ‘86  ‘91  ‘96  ‘81  ‘86  ‘91  ‘96  ‘81  ‘86  ‘91  ‘96
             
 < 6m  0  0  0  0  2  2  3  1  2  2  3  1
 6 - 6.9m  0  0  0  0  1  1  2  0  1  1  2  0
 7 - 7.9m  0  1  0  1  3  4  2  2  3  5  2  3
 8 - 8.9m  0  0  1  1  3  4  6  7  3  4  7  8
 9 - 9.9m  3  2  4  4  4  6  4  4  7  8  8  8
 10 - 10.9m  0  2  3  4  3  2  3  8  3  4  6  12
 11 . 11.9m  2  3  4  3  2  1  0  1  4  4  4  4
 12 - 12.9m  1  4  7  10  2  2  1  1  3  6  8  11
 13m +  0  0  0  3  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  5
    
 Total  6  12  19  26  20  22  21  26  26  34  40  52
 
 Table 4.  Regional Container Handling Terminals by Depth: 1981/'86/'91/'96
 Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants Ltd. 1997.
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 Besides the obvious concerns raised by the prospect of direct competition from
these terminals, there is a further aspect of this situation which needs to be
contemplated.  This is the emerging trend of Global Terminal Operators, or
Superport Companies.  According to Adrian Bascombe (Containerisation Intl,
1998c), in the present environment of port privatisation, political changes and carrier
globalisation, in an effort to overcome limited opportunities for domestic expansion,
spread investment risk across several economies and control handling operations
and costs, terminal operators, port authorities and shipping lines have all become
increasingly involved in the global container handling traffic sector.  Given the
burgeoning growth of containerisation world-wide, the terminal operating business
has been one of the fastest growing sectors of the industry in the 1990s and as
such has attracted more and more companies into the international management of
marine box facilities.  The major players in this market can be broadly categorised
as follows :
 
• Terminal operating companies - firms whose origins are in the successful
operations and management of national container terminals and are now
extending their expertise into the international arena.  Firms such as Hutchinson
Port Holdings (HPH), P&O Ports, Port of Singapore Authority Corporation (PSA
Corp) and Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) fall in this category.
• Terminal operating port authorities - state owned bodies such as the Dubai,
Indonesian and Sri Lankan Port Authorities which still control port operations.
• Terminal operating shipping lines - global carriers such as Maersk, Sea-Land
and Evergreen which control and manage dedicated terminals for themselves
and their partners.
 
 The significance of this latest trend to the port of Kingston is that in their quest to
become global terminal operators, several of the firms involved have been directly
responsible for the development of regional ports which now compete directly with
Kingston in the transhipment market.  The extent of their involvement will be
elaborated upon in section 5.4.2, as part of the port of Kingston’s SWOT analysis.
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 The existence of these terminals however constitutes only one element of the
overall threat to Kingston.  As expressed by David Hunter (Cargo Systems,1998),
the other danger is the competitive advantages that these ports will have versus
other regional ports which are being operated on the traditional, independent, stand-
alone basis.  In the areas of marketing, port pricing, productivity, human resource
management, information technology, equipment procurement and capital
financing, the global operator will be able to introduce higher standards and skills
into a region, thereby differentiating its facility from that of regional competitors.
Kingston would thus be hard pressed to maintain its competitive advantages in the
face of the tremendous resources these super-powered port operators would have
at their disposal.
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 2.4 EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
 
 One of the most profound technological changes to have taken place in the
shipping industry over the last thirty years is the advent of the container.  This
innovation has been the catalyst of sweeping changes in the sector, affecting such
aspects as cargo flow patterns, vessel designs and cargo handling techniques.  In
the effort to remain relevant and competitive in this fluid environment, ports and
terminals have had to continuously monitor these developments and adapt
accordingly.  Here we will examine some of the latest technological trends which are
taking place and their implications for ports in general and the port of Kingston in
particular.
 
 2.4.1 Trends In Vessel Type And Size
 
 Since the use of containers took hold in the 1960s, container dedicated ships have
grown in size and number consistently.  This trend can be illustrated by examining
table 5, which shows second rank vessel deployment in the Caribbean by type from
1986-1996.
 
 The most significant feature is the major increase in the deployment of fully cellular
vessels from 6 to 26 and from 667 to 16905TEU, which makes them the dominant
vessel type in the region, accounting for 26% of total capacity deployed in 1996, as
opposed to only 2.8% in 1986.
 
 In Kingston, growth is portrayed by tracking the development of Zim and Evergreen
line’s round-the-world services from 1986.  Vessel sizes on Evergreen’s westbound
service has increased in stages from 2743TEU in 1986, to 3428TEU in 1991 and
4229TEU in 1996.  Zim lines started with vessels of 2224TEU in ‘86, then 3000TEU
in ‘91 and 3500TEU in ’96 (OSC,1997,42).  The significance of these increases is
that as shipping lines seek to achieve economies of scale in order to reduce unit
costs and absorb trade growth, there is an increasing demand for bigger ships.
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 In 1986 container vessels with capacities of 2500TEU and over accounted for 12%
of total containership slots.  By 1995, this figure had increased to 29%.  The trend
does not stop here, as in the late 1980’s the 4000TEU barrier was breached and
post-Panamax container ships arrived, culminating in the Sovereign Maersk, which
is the world’s largest containership of dimensions 347m length, 43m beam and over
6600TEU capacity.  At the time of writing, serious discussions are taking place for
8000, 10000 and even 12000TEU vessels.
 
 Ship Type  Number  Capacity (TEUs)  Average
  ‘86  ‘91  ‘96  1986  1991  1996  1986  1991  1996
          
 Fully
Cellular
 
 6  6  26  667  3013  16905  111  502  650
 Semi -
cellular
 
 30  44  45  7939  14097  15832  265  320  352
 Barge
carrier
 
 -  2  13  -  1040  10569  -  520  813
 Ro - ro
 
 
 261  37  32  10192  13022  8573  392  352  268
 Ro - ro /
Cellular
 
 1  4  9  328  2120  7226  328  530  803
 Breakbulk
 
 
 7  11  14  158  1313  3093  23  119  221
 Conbulker
 
 
 1  3  2  456  3191  1726  456  1064  863
 Cellular
conversion
 
 3  7  2  4020  3056  1203  1340  437  602
 Total
 
 74  114  143  23760  40852  65127  321  358  455
 
 Table 5. Second Rank Caribbean Container Vessel Deployment by Type:
1986-1996
 Source:  Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1997.
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 The growth in size and number of containerships carry serious implications for
ports.  Faced with this expansion, ports had to make critical decisions about their
own development in order to keep pace.  With the growth of main line vessel size,
ports had to decide if they were indeed main line ports, and if so, undertake costly
investments to maintain their position.  Even if they were not main stream, ports
were still affected because the flood of post-Panamax tonnage into the east-west
trades has caused their previous Panamax vessels to be displaced into north-south
and other routes, which in turn sets off a domino effect resulting in the gradual
increase in vessel size thoughout the industry as illustrated above.  As a result of
this cascade effect, even secondary ports have to be making substantial
investments in post-Panamax gantry cranes.
 
 2.4.2 Trends in Cargo Flow Patterns.
 
 2.4.2.1 Development of Hub and Spoke Concept
 
 With the transition from breakbulk to containerised cargo, shipping lines shifted
from the “milkround” pattern of port calls to focus on major ports or “hubs” which
generated the majority of the cargo from within their hinterland.  The secondary
ports became serviced by feeder networks or “spokes”.  With the ongoing
rationalisation of major carriers into alliances and the introduction of post-Panamax
mega carriers on weekly sailing schedules, this “hub and spoke” system became an
even more integral part of container operations.  Using the tremendous volumes of
the northern hemisphere’s east-west trade corridor as a base, hub terminals
developed in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Colombo (in the Far East), Dubai
(in the Middle East), Algeciras (in the Mediterranean), Rotterdam, Hamburg and
Antwerp (in North Europe), New York/New Jersey ( on the USEC) and Long Beach
and Los Angeles (on the USWC).  These front rank ports were required to provide
the extensive infra- and superstructure necessary to remain in contention, as only
ports which could provide water depth of 14-15m, at least 3-4 post-Panamax cranes
per vessel and handle at least 1 million TEU per annum are able to cope effectively.
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 Such is the concentration of cargoes being routed through these hub ports due to
the need to achieve the necessary economies of scale, that now even major north-
south cargoes are being channelled through hubs on the east-west corridor strings
and subsequently transhipped to their destination.  For example, considerable
ECSA and Caribbean cargo from the Far East is being moved through ECNA hubs.
The spin-off effect of this however is that secondary or regional hubs have to be
established to further facilitate this revamped string network and the subsequent
feeder slings.  These second tier ports, although outside of the main east west trade
lanes, still need to be equipped to handle the Panamax sized vessels which have
now cascaded into their service area and thus strategically capitalise on this
emerging trend.
 
 2.4.2.2 Development of Pendulum Type Services
 
 Another notable change which emerged in cargo flow patterns was the fact that
major lines were now displaying a preference for pendulum type service patterns
rather than round-the-world services.  This was of course due to the mega-carriers
not being able to transit the Panama canal.  In this scenario, it is conceivable that
those carriers providing pendulum services between the Far East and ECNA via the
Suez canal could be extended into the Caribbean as part of providing a
comprehensive service.  As a matter of fact, according to John Fossey
(Containerisation Intl,1998b), the Grand Alliance expressed an intention to extend
its service which presently links Northern Europe, USEC, USWC and Asia to include
a hub in the Caribbean, from which they will target Central and South America.
Provided that these vessels were in the 5000-6000TEU range, Kingston would be
well placed to become the regional hub, being that Panama would be too far west
for vessels not actually transiting the canal.
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 2.4.2.3 Development of Double Stack trains
 
 At the start of the container revolution in the mid-1960s, the freight services
operated by the American, Canadian and European national railway services were
subservient to passenger trains.  With the persistent growth of container traffic
however, the concept of “block trains” entirely dedicated to box movement between
fixed destinations along passenger pathways eventually arose.  But it was not until
the development of the “double stack” train in North America that rail transport of
containers had a profound impact on the shipping industry.  This technological
development enabled 8x20’ or 4x40’ containers to be carried on an 80’ platform,
and reduced the cost of rail transport to the extent that it virtually eliminated the all
water transport of containers between the Far East and the USEC.  It became far
more economical to ship the cargo to the USWC and then transport it intermodally
via train to the East Coast or any point in between via a “micro”, “mini” or
“landbridge” rail operation.  The loss this caused to USEC ports is obvious, and
Kingston, by virtue of its position, also lost the tremendous opportunity of
participating in significant transhipment business.
 
 As it turns out, due to the emergence of post-Panamax vessels and the cultivation
and refinement of fast all-water routes between the US and the Far East via the
Suez canal, landbridging is currently losing favour with shipping lines.  This augers
well for Kingston, because it is still well placed to serve as the regional hub along
this new trade lane.
 
 Also of interest is the fact that there are two major railway projects under
consideration which may have implications for Kingston.  The first is the planned
reconstruction by the Panamanian government of the trans-isthmus Panama railway
in order to provide an intermodal rail link between the country’s Atlantic and Pacific
coasts.  The intention is to maintain the Canal’s strategic role in the face of post-
Panamax shipping operations.  Secondly, Costa Rica is also evaluating the creation
of a “dry canal” which would be a rail link to rival the Panama canal, as part of a 25
year development plan for a free trade zone, intermodal mega hub and state of the
art container terminal at Puerto Limon.
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 2.4.3 The Development of Cargo Handling Techniques.
 
 Innovation in container shipping must be accompanied by innovation in container
handling.  Mega carriers are placing ports under increasing pressure to maintain
turnaround times despite dramatic increases in vessel size, which leads to ports
having to rely in turn on increased automation in order to improve productivity
levels.  Examples of this automation can be seen in both quayside and landside
operations, with the introduction of pre-programmed crane cycles, fully automated
onshore and container yard gantries and stacking cranes, remote controlled
automatic guided vehicles for yard transfers and of course, “super” post-Panamax
gantry cranes capable of handling superships carrying containers 18 across.  The
proliferation of these cranes is probably the most visible evidence of the search for
increased efficiency being experienced by container terminals.  Under constant
threat of competition from ports eager to take their business, terminal operators
constantly seek to maintain their advantage with new and better cranes.  Whereas
the standard post-Panamax cranes were characterised by quayside outreaches of
44m and trolley travel speeds of between 150-180m per minute, the latest
generation carry specifications of 48m and 180-240m per minute respectively.
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 In addition to the quest for speed, the search for accuracy is equally important.  To
this end, technology in the form of sophisticated information technology (IT) and
electronic data interchange (EDI) systems are being utilised to plan, administer,
track, advise and report on operational details.
 
 For its part, Kingston has prepared itself with the purchase of 5 post-Panamax
cranes during its phased terminal expansion.  These cranes feature outreaches of
45.5m and travel at speeds of 210m/minute.  Besides these state of the art gantries,
the port further invested in the following IT systems:
 
• SHIPS - designed to generate optimal vessel discharge and loading sequences.
• SPACE - yard planning system for optimal container positioning, movement, and
inventory as well as maximising use of handling equipment.
• TRAFIC - provides enhanced terminal communications via radio data modules,
for tracking and management of yard equipment and containers.
• SIGNAL - an EDI link between terminal and shipping lines.
It could reasonably be stated that in this respect, Kingston appears well prepared to
defend its position.
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CHAPTER 3 THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN THE PORT OF KINGSTON
3.1 MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE INDUSTRY
Due to historical and political influences, the port of Kingston has developed along
certain lines into its present form.  In order to place things in their proper
perspective, it is necessary that these major players be identified and their
relationship to each other outlined.
3.1.1  The Port Authority of Jamaica.
The Port Authority of Jamaica (PAJ) is a statutory corporation empowered by the
government to be the country’s principal maritime body.  It is responsible for the
regulation and development of Jamaica’s port and shipping industry, as well as
operational supervision of the nation’s ports on the government’s behalf.
The Authority owns Kingston Container Terminals, the Port of Montego Bay, the
cruise ship terminals at Ocho Rios, Montego Bay, and Port Antonio, together with
the Free Zones in Kingston and Montego Bay.  It is also responsible for the pilotage
services used by all vessels, the provision of tugs, publication of Notices to
Mariners, the maintenance of all navigational aids, infrastructural development and
the raising of capital for investment.
With regards to Kingston Container Terminals, the Port Authority also owns the
superstructure, controls all marketing functions and sets tariffs.  It however
contracts out the management of the terminal operations to the private sector.
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Figure 2.  Schematic Layout
Source: Port Authority of Jamaica, 1997.
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3.1.2 Kingston Container Terminals
Kingston Container Terminals is managed by Kingston Wharves Limited through a
subsidiary company named Kingston Terminal Operators (KTO).  This is under a
contractual arrangement with the Port Authority.  Developed as a multi-purpose
container terminal, Kingston Terminals comprises of Berths 8-12 featuring:
• 1400m of berth (with water depth ranging from 9.5-14.6m)
• 47ha of container yard with a total storage capacity of over 18,000TEU
• 2 freight stations of 12,000 sq.m
• 428 reefer outlets
• 24m ro-ro ramp
• 8 gantry cranes (4 super post-Panamax)
• 30 straddle carriers, 9 RTGs, 34 yard tractors, 50 trailers
• US$ 3 million state-of-the-art maintenance facility
• Four integrated management and operational information technology systems
(refer section 2.4.3).
 
 The terminal is undergoing a phased expansion of its facility at Gordon Quay of
which phases one and two are already completed.  Phases three and four will
consist of construction of 305m of additional berth and further landside terminal and
storage areas.  A diagram of the layout of the port of Kingston is given in figure 2.
 
 Since its inception as a container handling facility, KTO has steadily improved its
world ranking, going from 105 in 1991, to 72 in 1996, as illustrated in table 6 below.
The terminal’s throughput went from 88,000 containers in 1990, to 327,000 in 1996,
and is expected to surpass 600,000 by the year 2000.  The terminal’s throughput
will be discussed in greater detail under section 3.3.
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 3.1.3 Kingston Wharves Limited
 
 Kingston Wharves Limited (KWL) is the port of Kingston’s single public wharf
company, created by the merger of the original KWL (berths 5-9) and Western
Terminals (berths 1-4) in 1994.  The result was a true multi-purpose terminal, with
its throughput being comprised of seventy percent containerised cargo, and the
remainder consisting mainly of bulk cargo and motor vehicles.  The company
operates berths 1-7 and has the following facilities:
 
• 1220m of berth (with water depth ranging from 6.7-9.4m)
• 20ha of container yard
• modern transit sheds of 43,000 sq.m
• cold storage space of 14,000 cu.m
• 88 reefer outlets
• 24m ro-ro ramp
• 6 heavy duty mobile cranes of capacity 140-280 tons
• 4 reach stackers, 5 toploaders, 3 heavy duty forklifts, 10 yard tractor/trailers
• modern information technology systems
 
 KWL committed itself to a US$30 million expansion programme over a 10 year
period in 1996.  As part of this programme, it recently completed a strategic study in
conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank, and is reviewing this
document with an eye to continue upgrading and modernising its facilities to
international standards.  It has demonstrated its commitment to the rationalisation of
port operations in Kingston by allowing the use of berths 8-9 free of cost by the Port
Authority as an integral part of the transhipment terminal, covered under the
management contract arrangements for KTO.  KWL has also offered to invest
upwards of US$10 million in the Gordon Quay project.
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 3.1.4 The Shipping Association of Jamaica.
 
 The Shipping Association of Jamaica (SAJ) is an employer’s union representing 63
private sector companies in the island’s shipping industry.  Its membership includes
shipping agents, wharf owners, terminal operators, stevedoring companies, ship
owners/operators and providers of ancillary services to the port of Kingston.  The
primary function of the SAJ is to manage and provide highly trained and cost
effective port labour, and as such maintains a pool of 400 port workers on its roster.
Additionally, the Association oversees the interests of its members in areas such as
training, security, industrial relations, computerisation and liaison with government
and trade agencies.
 
 The SAJ is governed by a Managing Committee drawn from the membership, and
convenes several Sub-committees which are assigned special areas of
responsibility, such as actions pertaining to matters of security, agency, industrial
relations and other maritime concerns.  The staff of the association manages and
attends to the requirements of port labour, as well as the activities and requirements
of the membership.
 
 The SAJ also serves as host of the Secretariat of the Caribbean Shipping
Association (CSA), which represents maritime interests in the Caribbean, Latin
America, United States and Europe.
 
 Finally, the SAJ has a fully owned subsidiary company called Port Computer
Services, which provides a wide range of data processing and computer services to
the shipping industry.  These services include website development, accounting
software packages, wide area network development with unlimited Internet access,
and customised software solutions among others.
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 3.1.5 Other Players
 
 There are other organisations besides the above-mentioned who have considerable
influence in the industry.  Among these are:
 
• the steamship agents for the major shipping lines calling Kingston e.g.  Caribstar
Shipping for Zim lines and Lannaman & Morris for Evergreen.
• the major independent stevedores working at KWL e.g.  Port Services Limited
and Shipping Services Limited.
• The labour unions representing the dock workers e.g.  the Bustamante Industrial
Trade Union (BITU), the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the United
Portworkers & Seamen Union (UPSU).
For the purposes of this paper however, their significance is limited.
PORTS 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Kingston 105 100 94 79 78 72
San Juan 16 15 15 16 17 17
Miami 55 52 43 41 43 48
Pt Limon 129 127 72 (74) 74 74
Pt Cabelle (240) 220 202 (180) 129 108
New Orleans 56 56 54 118 82 114
Cristobal 115 102 105 107 113 123
Port of Spain 176 271 240 165 145 139
Fort de France (172) 162 158 172 160 152
Point de Pitre 131 166 151 169 174 170
Willemstaad 173 188 173 193 193 (185)
Oranjestad 223 229 213 235 220 (218)
Table 6.  Caribbean Region’s Key Ports: Ranking in World (from top 300 ports)
Source: IMS,1998b
NB. Based on container throughputs.  Figures in brackets are estimated.
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3.2 DOMESTIC CARGO MARKET
In the context of this paper with its focus on Kingston as a regional hub port, the
significance of Kingston’s domestic cargo volumes is that they are, for all practical
purposes, too low.  High domestic cargo volumes is one of the prerequisites of
shipping lines as to their requirements of a transhipment terminal, and in this
respect, Kingston is falling short.  An examination of table 7 will show that in
comparison with its major competing ports in the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico,
Panama and Florida, although Kingston compares favourably in terms of total
volume, it performs dismally in terms of domestic cargo.  Kingston shows a
domestic throughput of only 86,000TEU, accounting for only 18% of its total
container throughput.  This is in comparison to Rio Haina, which has 357,000
domestic TEU representing 82% of its total, Manzanillo (MIT), which has 169,000
domestic TEU representing 48%, and Port Everglades, which has 526,000 domestic
TEU representing 75 % of total throughput.
At the moment, Jamaica’s port cargoes show a high level of containerisation,
already running at 84%, so there is little scope for expansion based on further
containerisation of general cargoes.  Any growth in domestic container trade would
therefore have to come from domestic economic growth.
In terms of economic growth, Jamaica’s record has not been impressive.  Between
1981-1996, the world economy has expanded by 65%, with the US showing slower
growth at 50%, the developing economies of the Americas showing even less
growth at 41% and Jamaica lagging considerably with only 33% growth over the
period.  Since 1991, Jamaica’s growth rates have been less than 2% per annum,
despite consistent growth in the US (its major trading partner) of 3.5%, and in the
regional developing countries of between 1.3-5%.  There is a strong correlation
between GDP growth and container port volumes, as shown in figure 3, therefore it
seems that in light of Jamaica’s dim prospects for the foreseeable future, the port of
Kingston will have to depend heavily on transhipment traffic for future expansion.
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‘000 TEUs 1985 Total
Transhipment
Domestic
%
%
1990 Totals
Transhipment
Domestic
%
%
1996 Totals
Transhipment
Domestic
%
%
KINGSTON 218.9
172.0
46.9
78.5
21.5
139.4
71.5
67.9
51.3
48.7
483.3
397.1
86.2
82.2
17.8
DOMINICAN REP 133.9
5.4
128.5
4.0
96.0
200.6
16.0
184.6
8.0
92.0
435.6
78.7
356.9
18.1
81.9
MIT -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
352.0
183.0
169.0
52.0
48.0
CRISTOBAL 77.3
23.2
54.1
30.0
70.0
123.3
61.7
61.6
50.0
50.0
169.0
84.5
84.5
50.0
50.0
COCO SOLO -
-
-
-
-
3.4
-
3.4
-
100.0
72.7
21.8
50.9
30.0
70.0
SAN JUAN 881.6
39.3
842.3
4.5
95.5
1381.4
48.5
1332.9
3.5
96.5
1640.6
108.3
1532.3
6.6
93.4
PT EVERGLADES 88.5
8.9
79.6
10.0
90.0
200.1
40.0
160.1
20.0
80.0
701.3
175.3
526.0
25.0
75.0
MIAMI 144.0
14.4
129.6
10.0
90.0
373.9
71.0
302.9
19.0
81.0
656.8
144.5
512.3
22.0
78.0
Table 7.  Domestic and Transhipment Volumes for Major Competing Ports: 1985-1996
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1997.
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3.3 Transhipment Cargo Market
Once again, because of Jamaica’s proximity to major trade routes, the port of
Kingston is ideally located to serve as a regional hub for the Caribbean and Central
America.  Table 8 details the performance of the port’s domestic and transhipment
cargo throughput from 1980-1996.  Of note is the growth of over 130% to
505,000TEU between 1985-1996.  The slump in transhipment volumes during
1988-90 was caused by the withdrawal of Evergreen’s services due to concerns
over drug smuggling.  Traffic however regained former levels in 1991-92 and has
been increasing ever since.  Also illustrated here is the growing importance of
transhipments to the port as a percentage of total throughput, as already referred to
in section 3.2 above.  This relationship is graphically displayed in figure 5.
In terms of transhipments, the scope of Kingston’s regional market is defined as
inclusive of container throughput at ports in the Caribbean islands, the US East
coast from Jacksonville south, the US and Central American Gulf coasts and the
Caribbean coasts of Central America, Colombia and Venezuela.  This market has
been quantified at 9.61 million TEU in 1996, of which the Caribbean accounted for
35%, the US ports for 37%, Central American ports for 22% and Colombia
/Venezuela for 6%.  Table 7 summarises the development of transhipment volumes
at principal transhipment ports in the regional market since 1985.
Of the Caribbean’s 35% share of the region’s market, Jamaica has always
demonstrated steady growth, except in the late 1980’s when it suffered the setback
due to Evergreen’s withdrawal.  As shown in table 9, Jamaica’s market share fell
from 13.0% in 1985, to 5.9% in 1990, but recovered steadily to 14% in 1996.
Now, as already observed in section 3.2, there is a strong correlation between GDP
growth and container port volumes.  It has already been recognised that due to the
limited performance of the Jamaican economy, any significant expansion in
container trade will have to come from growth in transhipment volume.
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YEAR DOMESTIC TRANSHIPMENT TOTAL
‘000
TEUs %
‘000
TEUs %
‘000
TEUs %
1980 38.7 24.4 120.0 75.6 158.8 100.00
1985 47.0 21.5 172.0 78.5 218.9 100.00
1986 57.1 21.3 210.8 78.7 267.9 100.00
1987 60.0 22.2 210.2 77.8 270.2 100.00
1988 85.2 45.6 101.6 54.4 186.8 100.00
1989 88.7 56.6 68.1 43.4 156.8 100.00
1990 73.3 50.6 71.5 49.4 144.7 100.00
1991 72.1 41.3 102.5 58.7 174.6 100.00
1992 67.3 34.6 127.1 65.4 194.4 100.00
1993 83.8 30.5 190.8 69.5 274.7 100.00
1994 82.9 21.6 300.5 78.4 383.4 100.00
1995 96.1 23.3 315.6 76.7 411.7 100.00
1996 86.9 17.2 418.9 82.8 505.8 100.00
Table 8.  KTO: Domestic and Transhipped Container Throughput 1980-1996
Source: Kingston Terminal Operators / Ocean Shipping Consultants - 1997
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1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
% ‘000
TEU
%
Kingston 158.8 12 218.9 13 139.0 5.9 170.0 6.6 189.2 7.4 265.0 9.5 340.1 12 384.3 12 483.3 14
Bahamas 43.4 3.4 54.2 3.2 80.2 3.4 54.4 2.1 64.1 2.5 62.5 2.2 62.0 2.1 64.5 2.1 67.4 2.0
Barbados 18.6 1.5 30.9 1.8 37.1 1.6 36.9 1.4 31.4 1.2 37.5 1.3 43.4 1.5 45.2 1.5 47.1 1.4
Dom. Rep. 27.0 2.1 133.9 7.9 200.6 8.5 226.2 8.8 227.9 8.9 291.0 10 372.9 12 451.6 14 435.3 13
Leewards 30.4 2.3 83.5 4.9 115.9 4.9 114.4 4.4 110.3 4.3 110.6 4.2 117.2 4.0 112.8 4.0 124.7 4.0
Nether. Ant. 51.8 4.1 48.8 2.9 95.2 4.0 91.2 3.5 116.6 4.5 118.0 4.4 118.7 4.0 126.2 4.2 123.2 3.9
Puerto Rico 864.2 68 908.9 53 1422 60 1614 63 1594 62 1596 57 1586 53 1580 51 1668 50
Trinidad 72.0 5.6 108.9 6.8 71.0 3.1 99.4 3.8 106.0 4.0 146.2 5.3 154.9 5.3 171.5 5.6 200.4 6.0
Windwards 16.9 1.3 61.6 4.0 157.9 6.7 122.6 4.7 115.3 4.5 132.0 4.8 151.7 5.1 156.1 5.0 176.6 5.3
Haiti n.a. - 40.3 2.4 45.7 1.9 40.3 1.6 18.9 0.7 29.0 1.0 29.0 1.0 20.0 0.6 20.0 0.6
TOTAL
1283.1 100 1689.9 100 2364.6 100 2569.4 100 2573.7 100 2787.8 100 2975.9 100 3112.1 100 3346.0 100
Table 9.  Caribbean Container Port Throughput and Market Shares: 1980 - 1996
Source: OSC,1997
39
Figure 4 serves to underline the strength of this relationship, as it graphically
compares the GDP growth of the developing nations of the Americas with KTO’s
transhipment throughput growth.  Aside from the fallout caused by the problem with
Evergreen in the late 1980’s, the similarity between the two is readily apparent.
This augers well for Kingston, since, as will be shown, the prognosis for growth in
regional cargo volumes is very good.
As opposed to forecasting domestic demand, there is no sure way of forecasting
transhipment demand since there are more factors involved than just volume of
trade.  For instance, whether and how often cargoes are discharged/loaded.
However, future development is certain to be more rapid for transhipment business
than for domestic volumes, given their historical rates of growth in the region and
the global trend towards transhipment as a consequence of increasing vessel size.
Furthermore, every transhipment involves 2 additional moves within the region
besides the initial loading and final discharge, which has a multiplier effect on port
throughput.  It is reasonable therefore to anticipate a rate of growth which is at least
double that achieved by domestic traffic, with a further boost due to the increasing
proportion of cargoes which are being transhipped.  Based on this, table 10 sets out
forecasts for both regional transhipment and container port volumes to 2000.  A
55% growth in regional transhipment volumes is forecast over 1997-2000, yielding
throughputs of 2.14 million TEU, with further growth to between 3.75-4.19 million
TEU in 2005, according to the pace of economic growth in the region.
Such is the potential for growth in this market that it is anticipated that even if there
was a gradual erosion of Kingston’s market share, the port would still experience
growth in traffic volumes.  Table 11 below outlines three scenarios wherein
Kingston’s market share is improved, maintained or eroded.  As can be observed,
even in the worst case, the port’s throughput is still expected to increase by 100%,
as compared to a 200% increase if regional market share is maintained, and a
250% increase if market share improves.
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million
TEUs
1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 % 2005 %
Total
Demand
10.39 11.22 12.10 13.06 17.99
Tranship
ment *
1.38 13.3 1.60 14.3 1.85 15.3 2.14 16.4 3.75 20.8
Domestic
Demand
9.01 9.62 10.25 10.62 14.24
Table 10.  Forecast Regional Container Transhipment and Domestic Demand
to 2005
* At regional hub ports only: currently Kingston, Rio Haina, San Juan, Freeport, MIT,
Cristobal, Coco Solo, Port Everglades and Miami.
Source: OSC,1997
million
TEUs
1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 % 2005 %
Maintain
position
0.46 33.6 0.54 33.6 0.62 33.6 0.72 33.6 1.41 33.6
Improve
position
0.47 34.0 0.56 35.0 0.67 36.0 0.79 37.0 1.68 40.0
Position
eroded
0.46 33.0 0.51 32.0 0.57 31.0 0.64 30.0 1.13 27.0
Total
Tranship
ment
1.38 1.60 1.85 2.14 4.19
Table 11.  Kingston Target Container Transhipment Volumes to 2005
Source: OSC,1997
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It must be pointed out that much of the success enjoyed by the port as a Caribbean
hub is attributable to the volume and range of deep sea and feeder services which
call the port.  Tables 12 and 13 below respectively give details of the major carriers
which use the terminal (based on container moves) and the key markets served by
carriers calling at Kingston.  Appendix 1 gives a comprehensive schedule of all lines
calling the port of Kingston, their agents, schedules and port rotations.
Carrier Moves %
ZIM 145,839 38.0
ZIAS 21.623 5.0
NCS 84,574 22.0
Eurosal 24,481 6.0
Evergreen 65,888 17.0
Kent Line 13,406 3.0
Sea-Land 9,123 2.0
Others 28,448 7.0
TOTAL 393,382 100.0
Table 12.  Kingston Container Terminal Users by Container Moves: 1997
Source: Port Authority of Jamaica,1997
Key Markets % of Carriers
ECNA 25.3
North Europe 19.0
Central America 10.1
ECSA 8.9
USGC 6.3
Far East 6.3
WCSA 6.3
Mediterranean 5.0
NCSA 3.8
Others 9.0
100.0
Table 13.  Key Markets Served by Carriers Calling at Kingston
Source: IMS,1998b
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CHAPTER 4 FACTORS OF PORT COMPETITIVENESS
There are several criteria by which the competitiveness of a port is judged,
however, the main standards used are usually indicators which are physical,
operational and financial in nature.  In this chapter, we will examine each set of
indicators in turn with a view of determining how the port of Kingston compares to
other players in the industry.
4.1 PHYSICAL INDICATORS
Using physical indicators is the most straightforward way to carry out a comparison
between ports.  In table 14 below we have detailed the ‘vital statistics’ of the major
ports in the Caribbean region, as well as other prominent terminals for contrast.
Upon observation it can be determined that within the Caribbean region, Kingston is
one of the leading ports in terms of its physical characteristics, and furthermore,
compares favourably with several other terminals of international standing.
43
PORT QUAY
LENGTH
(m)
YARD SIZE
(ha)
WATER
DEPTH
(m)
CRANAGE
(#)
CAPACITY
(‘000 TEUs)
Kingston 1400 47 14.6 8 700
Freeport 548 23 15.5 4 560
Rio Haina 273 5 10.6 2 500
San Juan 1372 14 10 5 1,800
Miami 1370 263 12.8 10 2,000
Pt Everglade 880 70 13.4 7 800
MIT 600 25 13.0 6 450
Christobal 445 12 10.7 2 200
Coco Solo 320 25 13.0 3 600
Malta 1480 39 15.5 10 1,500
ECT Delta 970 60 15 8 500
LA APL 1223 90 15 8 600
Le Havre 5250 190 14.5 22 3,500
Table 14.  Physical indicators.
Source: OSC,1997; Container Intl.1999a; Malta Freeport,1998; PAJ,1997; Irscha,1999;
Guide to Port Entry,1999.
4.2 OPERATIONAL INDICATORS
Operational indicators are the ones most commonly identified with by parties
seeking to determine a port’s capabilities.  These indicators are generally divided
into two categories, namely productivity and output criteria.
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4.2.1 Productivity Indicators
The sheer volume of containers handled is very important in determining a port’s
position in the industry, but this quantity must go hand in hand with quality if it is to
be of any consequence.  Big ports can be outmanoeuvred by smaller entities if
attention is not paid to maintaining certain levels of efficiency and productivity.
Monitoring productivity levels can be done in several ways.  For this exercise, the
following methods will be used to analyse the relative performances of the ports:
• TEUs handled per kilometre of quay per year
• TEUs handled per crane per year
• Containers handled per crane per hour
• Berth occupancy rate
4.2.1.1 TEUs Handled Per Kilometre Of Quay Per Year
In the 1980s, productivity in Kingston ranged between 0.19-0.37mil TEU/km of
quay.  The 1990s saw a growth in units handled to a 1995 peak of 0.60mil TEU/km
of quay.  In 1996, further capacity came on stream in the form of Gordon Quay,
resulting in a fall in utilisation rates to 0.39mil TEU/km of quay.
In the same way that Kingston suffered a fall in utilisation rates due to increased
capacity, so too did Miami, whose rate fell to 0.17mil TEU/km.  Miami’s reduction
was also due to a loss of throughput to Port Everglades, whose utilisation rates
mounted to 0.52mil TEU/km as a result.  In Manzanillo, the concentration of several
large gantry cranes on the terminal has caused the quayage to be stretched to
0.59mil TEU/km, while in Rio Haina and San Juan, Sea-Land’s dominant presence
and operational techniques have boosted their rates to 1.5mil TEU/km and 1mil
TEU/km respectively.  Table 15 sets out this information.
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PORT ‘000 TEUs
per gantry crane
‘000 TEUs
per berth kilometre
Kingston 60.4 389.8
Miami 65.7 170.4
Port Everglades 116.9 517.2
MIT 58.7 586.7
Rio Haina 200.6 1469.2
San Juan 273.4 971.9
Table 15.  Major Regional Transhipment Ports: Terminal Productivity 1996
Source: OSC,1997
Table 16 shows the development of average utilisation rates at major port ranges in
Asia, North America, Europe and the Caribbean.  In 1996, the average throughput
per kilometre of quayage was 0.27mil TEU in the US Atlantic South range, 0.22mil
TEU in North Continental Europe, 0.43mil TEU in North East Asia and 0.38mil TEU
in the Caribbean.  Utilisation in Asia is higher due to high land prices in Japan and
congestion in South Korean ports, while Caribbean rates have been boosted by
high rates obtaining at Rio Haina and Puerto Rico due to Sea-Land’s dominant
presence and special operational techniques.  Overall however, Kingston’s rate of
0.39mil TEU/km compares favourably, especially in light of the fact that it has a
history of substantially higher performance.
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YEAR KINGSTON Caribbean North American:
Atlantic South
Range
European North
Continent
North-East Asia
1986 366.0 350.1 115.0 226.8 343.4
1987 346.9 332.0 122.4 214.6 346.2
1988 248.2 354.9 144.0 198.8 347.4
1989 209.2 381.6 155.0 211.8 363.7
1990 190.4 410.5 161.2 204.5 383.8
1991 232.0 348.2 166.2 189.8 384.2
1992 295.6 324.1 186.5 186.4 350.8
1993 414.1 338.7 193.5 192.4 370.0
1994 531.4 383.0 202.9 207.8 398.1
1995 600.5 381.9 253.4 211.9 489.2
1996 389.8 380.2 269.5 217.2 427.4
Table 16.  Kingston and Major Port Ranges: Berth Kilometre Productivity per ‘000 TEUs (1986 - 1996)
Source: OSC,1997
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YEAR KINGSTON Caribbean North America:
Atlantic South
Range
European North
Continent
North-East Asia
1986 67.0 142.7 58.7 87.8 58.7
1987 63.3 102.9 64.7 75.6 60.9
1988 45.4 110.0 69.5 75.7 64.2
1989 38.3 109.9 60.6 66.8 66.6
1990 34.8 118.2 63.0 63.7 67.0
1991 34.0 111.7 50.9 66.7 67.2
1992 37.8 95.3 55.6 64.0 65.0
1993 53.0 103.3 52.6 64.7 66.8
1994 68.0 110.2 56.4 71.7 69.1
1995 76.9 111.1 61.7 71.9 83.5
1996 60.4 107.9 65.9 72.5 75.7
Table 17.  Kingston and Major Port Ranges: Gantry Crane Productivity per ‘000 TEUs (1986 - 1996)
Source: OSC,1997
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4.2.1.2 TEUs Handled Per Crane Per Year
With respect to throughput handled per crane annually, productivity in the port of
Kingston ranged between 33,900-67,000 TEU in the 1980s.  This peaked at 76,900
per crane in 1995, when the introduction of additional cranes resulted in a reduction
to utilisation rates of 60,400 per crane per year.
Table 17 outlines Asian, North American, European and Caribbean average
utilisation rates in from 1986 - 1996.  Here we see again that in 1996, Kingston’s
rate compares favourably with average throughput rates per gantry crane of 65,900
TEU in the US South Atlantic range, 72,500 TEU in north continental Europe, and
75,700 in north east Asia.  The relatively high rate of 107,900 per crane for the
Caribbean is skewed by the high rates of Puerto Rico and Rio Haina, which
together accounted for 63% of Caribbean port traffic in 1996.
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4.2.1.3 Containers Handled Per Crane Per Hour
Probably the most easily recognisable productivity indicator for container terminals
is the speed with which they can work a vessel, i.e.  how many moves per hour their
cranes can consistently achieve.  This factor varies widely around the world, with
leading ports like Singapore and Hong Kong handling boxes at a rate of 86 and 74
containers per hour respectively.  These rates are exceptional however, as
Singapore’s rates are actually 35% higher than Rotterdam’s and twice those
recorded in Osaka (D.Hunter,Cargo Systems,1998).  According to Mike Ircha during
his IPP2 seminar, a study on average gross output of gantry cranes working on
third generation ships revealed a productivity rate of 17.7 container moves per hour.
This is in line with the findings of Hunter who maintains that in most regions,
productivity rarely exceeds 25 moves per hour.  Our own field trip experience seems
to bear this out, as Le Havre maintains a rate of 24 moves/hr and Malta Freeport
operates at a modest 18 moves/hr.  Bearing all this in mind, Kingston’s rated
performance of 24 container moves per hour is on par, and should be acceptable to
any shipping line.
4.2.1.4 Berth occupancy rate
Given the escalating daily running costs of operating a liner service, shipping lines
are very keen on avoiding delays in any form, and particularly those related to
waiting on a berth due to congestion.  According to Professor B. Francou in his
lectures on Port Performance Indicators, a port of Kingston’s dimensions should
have a berth occupancy rate not exceeding 66%.  Figure 6 below shows the
progress of both berth occupancy and vessel delay rates in the Kingston Container
Terminal from April ‘95 to December ‘97.  The dramatic impact of the opening of
Gordon Quay in mid 1996 is clearly reflected, with berth occupancy rates falling
from a peak of 90% to acceptable levels of between 50-55%.  Vessel delays due to
unavailability of berth similarly fell from a total of 225 hours per quarter, to level out
at 50 hours by December ‘97.
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Figure 6.  Kingston: Vessel Delays / Berth Occupancy (1995 - 1997)
Source: KTO
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4.2.2. Output Indicators
It has already been noted in section 3.1.2 that in terms of volume, Jamaica ranked
43 in the world and Kingston ranked 72 as a port in 1996.  Table 19 shows the
container port throughputs for 1985-1996 for the major competing ports in the
region.
At the time, Kingston was the leading boxport in the Caribbean, and was surpassed
in the region only by Miami, Port Everglades and Puerto Rico, due to their having
much stronger domestic cargo volumes.  Table 18, featuring the top twenty
container terminals in the world, has also been presented so as to facilitate
comparison and provide perspective.
RANK(Last Year) PORT 1998 TEUs 1997 TEUs
1 (2) Singapore 15,100,000 14,135.300
2 (1) Hong Kong 14,650,000* 14,567,231
3 (3) Kaohsiung 6,271,053 5,693,339
4 (4) Rotterdam 6,032,000* 5,494,655
5 (5) Busan 5,752,955 5,233,880
6 (6) Long Beach 4,097,689 3,504,603
7 (7) Hamburg 3,550,000 3,337,477
8 (9) Los Angeles 3,378,218 2,959,715
9 (8) Antwerp 3,265,750 2,969,189
10 (11) Shanghai 3,066,000 2,520,000
11 (10) Dubai 2,800,000 2,600,085
12 (15) Felixstowe 2,500,000* 2,251,379
13 (12) New York/New Jersey 2,450,000* 2,456,886
14 (14) Tokyo 2,450,000* 2,332,000
15 (13) Yokohama 2,200,000* 2,347,635
16 (27) Gioia Tauro 2,125,640 1,448,531
17 (17) Kobe 2,087,000* 1,944,147
18 (19) San Juan 1,922,150* 1,781,250
19 (19) Tanjung Priok 1,898,069 1,908,711
20(23) Algeciras 1,825,614 1,537,627
Table 18.  World’s Leading Boxports: 1998
* Estimated
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 1999
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‘000  TEUs 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Kingston (Jamaica) 218.9 267.9 253.2 181.7 153.2 139.4 169.8 189.2 265.0 340.1 384.3 483.3
Bridgetown (Barbados) 30.9 30.7 31.2 33.5 37.4 37.1 36.9 31.4 37.5 43.4 45.2 47.1
Port of Spain (Trinidad) 107.4 73.0 53.5 42.5 47.2 57.0 81.5 86.6 101.5 129.5 145.2 185.8
Dominican Republic 133.9 179.7 156.0 126.8 171.5 200.6 226.2 227.9 291.0 372.9 451.6 435.6
Freeport (Bahamas) 18.5 20.7 20.9 23.9 25.9 46.2 24.4 24.6 25.6 24.8 26.5 29.6
Pt.a Pitre (Guadeloupe) 74.9 72.7 79.0 93.7 95.7 102.1 99.9 95.2 95.6 100.5 95.8 103.5’
San Juan (Puerto Rico) 881.6 963.0 1169.8 1245.3 1289.0 1381.4 1584.0 1563.7 1559.4 1533.6 1539.0 1640.6
Pt. Limon (Costa Rica) 94.0 106.0 117.4 157.6 172.1 192.1 229.2 310.6 320.0 323.0 365.0 395.0
Colon-MIT (Panama) - - - - - - - - - - 180.0 352.0
Cristobal (Panama) 77.3 102.8 128.6 106.2 102.7 123.3 162.4 177.9 192.3 194.4 169.7 169.0*
Coco Solo (Panama) - - - - - 3.4 18.2 49.4 54.7 61.0 72.6 72.7*
Pt. Everglades (Florida) 88.5 110.9 206.5 228.5 241.5 200.1 192.5 209.6 226.7 251.7 632.8 701.3
Miami (Florida) 144.0 150.3 175.9 273.1 338.0 373.9 408.0 520.0 572.2 629.3 656.2 656.8
Table 19.  Caribbean, Central American, USA South East: Container Port Throughputs 1980 - 1996
* Estimate
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants
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4.3 FINANCIAL INDICATORS
The current economic environment in the maritime industry has created a situation
wherein as shipping lines demand greater value for their money, ports are forced to
invest in costly equipment and infrastructural expansion in order to meet service
requirements.  At the same time, because of depressed freight rates, shipping lines
are not willing to pay any for these facilities, making it necessary for ports to finance
these investments through increased throughput and greater operational
efficiencies.  The need to carefully monitor their financial progress in order to realise
a return on their investments has made ports come to attach increasing importance
to financial indicators as a guide to them achieving their economic objectives.
Based on either cost or revenue related elements, these financial indicators are
drawn from such areas as revenue, taxes or the cost of capital infrastructure,
equipment, labour, or land.  It is however very difficult to achieve proper
comparisons between ports based on these items, because the situation of each
port is different, and any analysis would have to make allowances for differences
such as government subsidies, tax exemptions, and salary fringe benefits, to name
a few.  Probably one of the most straightforward financial indicators available, and
certainly the one most interesting to shipping lines, is the port’s tariff of charges.
Table 20 below itemises the container handling rates charged by the competing
ports in the region.  Kingston’s ship to gate cost of US$ 273 per domestic container
places it in the top half of the list, but its transhipment rate of US$ 116 per move is
about average.
On the other hand, when compared to charges in other regions (table 21) taken
from a recent survey of 84 ports world-wide, Kingston is substantially more
expensive.  This disparity may however be due in part to the fact that port charges
in most developed countries have been driven downwards by intense price
competition.
These figures will be revisited in section 5.2.1 as part of the SWOT analysis of the
port.
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COUNTRY/PORT Status IMPORTS EXPORTS
Full Empty Full Empty
1. Jamaica
Kingston 20’ 273 273 273 273
40’ 273 273 273 273
Feeder 116 116 116 116
2. Colombia
Barranquilla 20’ 266 95 304 110
40’ 342 152 323 182
Cartagena 20’ 304 95 332 110
40’ 399 152 427 182
Feeder 171 58 226 58
3. Costa Rica
Pt. Limon 20’ 331 77 243 115
40’ 331 77 243 115
Feeder 357 204 372 134
4.Dominican Republic
Rio Haina 20’ 71 39 107 59
40’ 71 39 107 59
5. Panama
Cristobal 20’ 270 53 190 28
40’ 540 105 380 56
Feeder 488 116 346 81
6. Puerto Rico
San Juan 20’ 349 220 335 220
40’ 349 220 335 220
7. North America
Miami 20’ 205 91 205 91
40’ 205 91 205 91
New Orleans 20’ 276 146 256 146
40’ 295 172 276 172
Table 20.  Caribbean Region’s Key Ports: Terminal Handling Charges
Source: IMS,1998b
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PORT REGION RATE per TEU
Full Empty
Kingston 273 273
South & Central America 252 98
North America 213 142
Asia / Far East 120 93
Mediterranean 118 74
North Europe 89 78
Middle East 80 65
Table 21.  Major Port Ranges: Average Container Handling Charges
Source: IMS,1997a
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CHAPTER 5 SWOT ANALYSIS
In order to present a comprehensive picture of the circumstances of the port of
Kingston a SWOT analysis was undertaken.  The findings are presented below and
will appraise the reader of all the issues surrounding the port’s situation.
5.1 STRENGTHS
5.1.1  Excellent Geographical Location
Probably the greatest advantage the port of Kingston possesses is the fact that it
sits near the geographical centre of the Caribbean sea, being flanked to the north
by the US Gulf, to the east by the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, to the south by
the north coast of the South Americas and to the west by Central America.  This
location, just 51 kilometres from the Panama canal, places the port in close
proximity to both major global east-west trade routes transiting the canal and north-
south American trade lanes, all of which have been discussed in greater detail in
section 2.1 above.  Calling the port of Kingston would therefore require a minimum
of deviation by main line vessel services, thereby fulfilling one of the main criteria of
a ‘hub’ centre port.  For instance, as mentioned in section 2.4.2.2, the fact that
Kingston is closer to the ECNA than the Panamanian ports which are on the
extreme western rim of the Caribbean basin, makes Kingston the better choice for
the location of a transhipment hub to serve a pendulum service from the Far East
relaying cargo to the region.  This unique quality of being centrally positioned gives
Kingston a similar advantage over such competitors as Miami, Freeport, San Juan
and Port of Spain.
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5.1.2 Modern Terminal Facilities
The port facilities offered by Kingston, as detailed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, rank
among the finest in the region.  The Port Authority and the private sector have gone
to great lengths to provide a terminal which can efficiently handle the requirements
of major shipping lines seeking a regional hub for their operations.
5.1.3 Abundant Space
One of the features of modern day container terminals is the requirement for
increasingly large amounts of container storage space.  With the trend upward of
vessel size and capacity, it is also essential that terminals have room for expansion.
In both these respects, Kingston is one of the few ports in the region that is blessed
with lots of room for both present operations and for expansion when necessary.
By comparison, competing ports such as Rio Haina, Cristobal and Miami to a lesser
extent have little scope for expansion, or would have to do so at great expense
through land reclamation.
5.1.4 Deep Water Approaches and Short Estuarial Passage
Maintaining a reliable schedule and spending a minimum of time in port are both
essential to a successful shipping operation.  Carriers therefore favour ports that
require minimal deviation from main shipping routes and the shortest distance from
the fairway buoy to the berth.  Kingston’s proximity to the trade lanes has already
been discussed at length, and it only takes approximately one hour to transit the
approach channel once the pilot has boarded.
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5.2 WEAKNESSES
5.2.1 High Port and Terminal Costs
As shipping lines struggle for survival in the current environment of depressed
freight rates, they naturally seek to cut their costs and thus pressure ports and
terminals to reduce their charges.  Terminals which can provide quality service at
competitive rates will therefore have a major edge.  The prices charged by Kingston
relative to other ports has been discussed in detail in section 4.3.  Of note is the fact
that in the Caribbean region, Kingston’s domestic rate of US$ 273/move makes it
relatively expensive, but more significantly, its transhipment rate of US$ 116/move,
is the cheapest among its competitors with the exception of Rio Haina, which is
25% lower.  With respect to international standards, when compared to the average
regional charges listed in table 21, Kingston transhipment rate is 23% more
expensive than North European ports, 31% more expensive than the Middle East,
about the same as both the Mediterranean and the Far East, and more than 40%
cheaper than North, South and Central American ports.  Whereas it appears that
within the region Kingston’s rates are very competitive, it is foreseeable that
shipping lines will continue to press for reductions in an effort to bring port charges
in line with the lowest common denominator.  It therefore behooves Kingston to take
stock of its situation and prepare to rid itself of any ‘fat’ which is built into its rate
structure.  As such it is good that certain costs in Kingston which are presently
being passed on to shipping lines, such as dead time charges and certain premium
allowances for the labour which are a result of restrictive labour practices are
presently being reviewed.  Other expense elements resulting from high finance
charges and low productivity will also have to be examined with a view to reducing
or eliminating them in the short to medium term.
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5.2.2 Poor Industrial Relations
The Kingston Waterfront has been hailed as the birthplace of the Jamaican labour
movement over 50 years ago and as such the there is a strong tradition of labour
representation that exists to this day.  The dock workers are primarily represented
by three main trade unions, namely, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, the
Trade Union Congress and the United Portworkers and Seamen Union.  This
multiplicity of bargaining units is a weakness in itself, and made for disruption and
duplicity at the best of times, and at worst has resulted in labour unrest and
industrial action.  The situation on the port has been likened to that of the UK dock
scene of twenty years ago, before the repeal of the National Dock Labour scheme.
In the past the management of the port, in an effort to achieve an all important
reputation for reliability, granted many concessions which came back to haunt them
in the form of restrictive practices.  These practices burdened the port with inflexible
and outdated manpower solutions, the costs of which were passed on directly to
shipping lines, who were becoming more and more unwilling to pay.
This increasing reticence by shipping lines, coupled with their demands for lower
prices and higher productivity, left the port’s management in a difficult position, as
any attempt to broach the topic of restrictive practices with the unions was met with
total resistance.  In desperation, a Board of Enquiry was convened under the
auspices of the Ministry of Labour in an effort to break this deadlock.  The scope of
this enquiry will be discussed further in section 6.1.2, but suffice it to say that
preliminary estimates indicate that successful revision of present working practices
to those in force on competing ports would result in cost savings for the port of
approximately US$ 2 million annually.
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5.2.3 Low Domestic Cargo Volumes
As discussed in section 3.2, Jamaica’s domestic container cargo volumes are
relatively low, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total port traffic.  As
shown in table 7, Kingston’s domestic volumes in 1996 of 86,000 TEUs does not
compare favourably with those of its main competitors, namely Dominican Republic
with 357,000 TEUs, MIT with 169,000, San Juan with 1,532,000 and Miami and Port
Everglades with 512,000 and 526,000 TEUs respectively.  As a percentage of total
traffic, Kingston’s position is equally unimpressive. Domestic cargo accounts for
only 18% of Kingston’s container traffic, while amongst its rivals, the figure ranges
from a low of 48% (MIT) to a high of 93% (San Juan).  It has been noted that
Kingston’s present levels of domestic cargo could easily be handled using only
berths 1-9 , three gantries and a fraction of the remaining port equipment, thus it is
clear that the domestic traffic alone is unable to support the major part of the
investment on the port.
This is not to say that Kingston cannot compete successfully as a transhipment hub
given this handicap, as terminals such as Freeport, Bahamas (500,000TEU of
which only 5% is domestic) and Marsaxlokk, Malta (1 million TEU of which only 2%
is domestic) have overcome this disadvantage.  It would however strengthen
Kingston’s position if this situation could be addressed and any increase in domestic
cargo would enhance Kingston’s attractiveness as a transhipment centre.
5.2.4  Inadequate Market Research
According to Invicta Management Services, after having discussions with the senior
port management in Kingston they were left with the impression was that there was
a general lack of knowledge about the changing face of liner shipping and
developments in the container industry.  This resulted in a reactive rather than
proactive approach to marketing, and the use of ‘shotgun’ rather than ‘sniper’
strategies to attract new business to the port.
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Market research is a fundamental tool for any strategic planning, and the lack of
clear targets of where the port should be positioning itself in the market place will
create serious difficulties in the port’s efforts to become the regional transhipment
hub of choice.
5.2.5  Limited Market Penetration
Analysis of table 12 above reveals that 65% of Kingston’s container traffic comes
from only two customers, namely Zim/ZIAS and NCS.  Having such a narrow
customer base is cause for concern, particularly in the current environment where
carriers are proving increasingly fickle in their choice of ports.  One only has to
recall the discussions in chapter 2 wherein Maersk and Evergreen, for differing
reasons, transferred their transhipment business from Kingston to other ports.
Having as wide a customer base as possible is the only safeguard against suffering
severe repercussions when any particular line pulls out of the port.
5.2.6 Cumbersome Organisational Structure
There are a number of parties within the maritime sector of the port of Kingston with
vested interests in the port’s welfare.  The key players are the PAJ, SAJ, KTO,
KWL, other stevedores, and the labour unions (BITU, TUC, UPSU).  The existence
of these players is not a problem in itself, as other ports such as Le Havre feature
many parties at work in their port.  What is cause for concern in Kingston is that, as
opposed to Le Havre which has its ‘Port Alliance’ program, there is no central
blueprint guiding the port’s development, and each party seems to be operating on
its own agenda.  This does not auger well for the port’s steady advancement.
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5.2.7 Under-utilised Labour Pool
As a result of port labour’s historical development, and due in no small part to
restrictive practices, the blue collar labour pool in the port has grown to the point
where there is now not enough work to keep all the dock workers fully occupied.
Attempts are presently being made to rationalise the workforce by offering early
retirements and redundancies, and by training the remainder to become multi-
skilled and multi-functional.
5.2.8 High Levels of Capitalisation
The ambitious development of Gordon Quay has absorbed huge amounts of capital,
sourced from international development banks through the Port Authority and
guaranteed by the Government of Jamaica.  Thus, the rates of interest are
reasonably low, but the repayment schedules still dramatically increases the capital
costs of the terminal, which will have to recoup this investment from present traffic
until such time that the throughput increases, justifying the investment.
5.3 OPPORTUNITIES
The opportunities open to the port of Kingston will form part of the basis of
proposals made by the author and as such these discussions will be deferred to
chapter 6.
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5.4 THREATS
5.4.1 Growing Competition From Other Regional Ports
Kingston has certain natural advantages as a candidate for being the major
transhipment hub of the region.  These advantages are however being eroded for a
variety of reasons, and other ports in the region are seizing the opportunity to
develop facilities of their own to tap into this lucrative market.
Extracted from OSC data, the author considers the following port developments as
the most significant :
• Freeport - Bahamas was commissioned in July 1997 with 548 meters (m) of
berth, 4 super post-Panamax gantry cranes, 23 hectares (ha) of container yard
and 15m of water depth alongside.  Already running at volumes of 500,000TEU
annually, work has already started on phase II.  Scheduled for completion in late
1999, this phase will add another 366m of berth, 3 more cranes, 37ha of
container storage and boost capacity to 950,000TEU per year.
• Manzanillo - Colon, Panama was opened in March 1995 featuring 600m of berth,
water depth alongside of 13m, 6 gantry cranes (of which 4 are post-Panamax)
and 25ha of yard space.  Expansion plans for the port are to add a further 600m
of berth, 16ha of storage space and 4 more gantry cranes which will effectively
increase the terminal’s capacity from 450,000 to 800,000TEU per annum.
• Christobal - Panama has 445m of berth, depth alongside of 11m, 2 Panamax
gantry cranes and approximately 10ha of container yard.  Plans are to upgrade
the cranes to post-Panamax, increase yard capacity to 18ha, and increase
throughput to 300,000TEU annually.
• Balboa - Panama is being developed alongside Christobal.  Plans are for a 350m
berth equipped with 3 super post-Panamax cranes and suitable storage area and
depth alongside which will allow it to accommodate the worlds’ largest vessels
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• Colon - Coco Solo, Panama features 324m of berth, water depth in excess of
10m, and 3 post-Panamax gantry cranes.  An extension of 312m of berth with 2
additional gantry cranes is planned which will raise capacity from 600,000 to 1
million TEU per annum.
• Miami - Florida has added to its already considerable facilities.  The port now
features over 1400m of berth, with the berths at Dodge Island dredged to 13m
depth.  4 post-Panamax cranes were added, bringing the total number of cranes
to 10, and a 40ha landfill boosted container storage.  Port capacity now stands at
2 million TEU, of which 813,000 was used in 1998.
• Port Everglades - Florida has 600m of berth with depth of 13m, 7 post-Panamax
gantry cranes and over 70ha of container storage, handling over 4 million tons of
cargo annually.
• Rio Haina - Dominican Republic has had its container yard extended by 2ha and
its water depth increased from 8 to 10.5m.
• There are also developments taking place in Port of Spain, Trinidad; Pointe a
Pitre, Guadeloupe; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Puerto Limon, Costa Rica;
Cartagena, Columbia and Veracruz/Altamira/Tuxpan, Mexico, but these are of
less relevance with regards to Kingston.
• It should also be borne in mind that Cuba has great potential once the US trade
embargo is lifted.
5.4.2 Emergence of Global Terminal Operators
The emerging trend of global terminal operators or superport companies, as raised
in section 2.3, is one that carries serious implications for the port of Kingston.  The
threat this development poses to Kingston arises from the fact that many of the
regional port developments discussed in section 5.4.1 above are the direct result of
initiatives taken by these organisations in their drive to establish global networks of
container terminals.  Below is a breakdown of the relationships between these
global operators and their projects in the Caribbean region:
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• The Freeport Container Port (FCP) is a joint venture between the Grand Bahama
Port Authority and the Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH),
reputed to be the largest independent port operator in the world.
• The Manzanillo International Terminal (MIT) in Colon, Panama, is a joint venture
between Motores Internacionales of Panama and the Seattle-based Stevedoring
Services of America (SSA).
• The Panamanian ports of Christobal and Balboa are both being developed and
operated by Hutchinson Ports under a 25 year concession granted to them.
• The Colon Container Terminal at Coco Solo North in Panama is a dedicated
terminal facility being developed by Evergreen.
• Rio Haina in the Dominican Republic has undergone substantial development as
a dedicated relay terminal for Sea-Land.
 
 Not only is the factor of increased competition a serious concern for Kingston, but
also the fact that the tremendous resources that these mega-operators have at their
disposal could well result in the port being outmatched and unable to compete
effectively, especially since these global players could well decide to adopt global
pricing strategies as part of their efforts to attract shipping lines to their facilities
world-wide, using one facility to subsidise another.  Kingston could not withstand
such financial pressure for any extended period.
 
 5.4.3 Changes in the Nature of the Maritime Industry
 
 The increasing effect of globalisation on the maritime industry, as addressed in
Chapter 2, has thrown the entire industry into a state of transition.  The following
factors now have to taken into consideration by ports and terminals wishing to
remain relevant:
 
• growth of mega consortia and alliances
• relentless pursuit of economies of scale
• growth of hub and spoke operations
• effect of declining freight rates
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• concentration of bargaining power into the hands of fewer operators
• increasing pressure by shipping lines to reduce operating costs
• political influences
The old ways of doing business no longer apply, and the successful hub centres of
tomorrow will be the terminals which address the issues of today.
5.4.4  Inadequate Return on Investment
Conventional wisdom in the shipping industry formerly maintained that if you built
the facilities, then the ships would follow.  In today’s increasingly competitive
environment however, careful planning is necessary to avoid the dangers of over
investment, which can be just as detrimental as not investing enough.  The time
during which Kingston could have comfortably expanded its facilities, secure in the
knowledge that the traffic justifying the investment would materialise, is probably
past.  Now it will take shrewd marketing to ensure that the port’s recent investments
will bring adequate returns and not become a burden to taxpayers.
5.4.5 Unstable Labour Platform
The fact that several strong labour unions (i.e. the BITU, TUC and UPSU) are
involved in the representation of dockworkers on the port of Kingston creates an
element of uncertainty on the labour scene.  In this environment, the practice of
‘one-upmanship’ and the pursuit of differing agendas can prove inimical to the
overall development of the port.  Efforts to rationalise and consolidate these
interests into a collective unit, and furthermore to recruit them as part of a team
focused on the bigger picture of advancing the port’s cause against outside forces
are imperative.  It is only by harmonising the relationship between the trade unions
themselves, and between them and management, that meaningful progress can be
made towards eliminating counterproductive policies, such as restrictive practices.
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5.4.6 Political Influences
It is perhaps inevitable that in a relatively small maritime community, political
influences play a significant role in the activities of the port.  Unfortunately, political
influences can become personalised, and personal agendas, whether corporate or
individual, can cloud common objectives.  Power struggles can lead to the parties
involved becoming distracted from key strategic issues, which is detrimental to the
formulation of policies which should be geared towards the port’s survival and long
term prosperity.  For instance, the present situation of there being no clear
understanding as to whether KTO’s management contract will be renewed by the
PAJ, creates a situation wherein the private sector (in the form of KWL) may start
hedging their bets by developing their own facilities instead of throwing in their lot
with the PAJ.  Given that the ‘game’ is no longer local, but rather global in scope, it
is imperative that previous differences be set aside and all parties concerned should
apply themselves to meeting the challenges as a unified front with a common goal.
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CHAPTER 6 PROPOSALS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The situation that the port of Kingston finds itself in dictates that it should take a
two-pronged approach to maintaining its competitiveness in the face of the effects
of globalisation.  These approaches are:
1. To take the necessary steps to mitigate or eliminate those shortcomings existing
in the port’s make-up, which show up as weaknesses and threats in the SWOT
analysis.
 
2. To implement measures designed to capitalise on the various opportunities
which exist for the port.
6.1 MANAGING WEAKNESSES
The shortcomings suffered by Kingston (as detailed in section 5.2) tend to fall in
one of four categories. These are:
a) Those problems relating to costs.
b) Those problems relating to labour.
c) Those problems relating to marketing.
d) Those problems relating to organisational structure.
The author will deal with each of these areas in turn, offering strategies geared to at
least reducing the negative effects of these problems.
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6.1.1 Problems Relating to Costs
High port and terminal costs have been discussed at length in section 5.2.1 as one
of the principal weaknesses of the port.  At present, the possibility of reducing the
rates in the short term are not good, especially in light of the fact that the recent
massive expenditure on the Gordon Quay expansion would have added even
greater margins to the port’s overhead costs.  The focus here should be on
measures to reduce the high incidence of dead time charges imposed on the
shipping lines presently, which are actually a consequence of the restrictive labour
practices which exist on the port.  In the author’s opinion, these restrictive practices
are the root of many of the evils which beset the port, and as such it is a matter of
extreme urgency that they be examined and eliminated.  More will be said on this
issue in the following section.
Although restrictive practices have been pinpointed as germane to the problem of
high port charges, an actual analysis of the labour content of Kingston’s charges
reveal that compared to Europe where the labour element of port charges averages
50-55%, in Kingston they account for only approximately 20% (IMS,1998b,34).  This
therefore indicates that there are also other significant elements adversely affecting
the rates, which are most likely high capital costs and relatively low levels of
productivity.  On the issue of high capital costs, little can be done at this point,
because the port would have already committed itself and is liable for these
payments.  There is however the prospect of even more expansion of the Gordon
Quay facility, and it is the author’s opinion that the financing of this phase should not
come from international development banks as it has been to date, but rather from
equity investment from the private sector, whether local or foreign.  The private
sector in Jamaica, in the form of KWL, has a standing offer of some US$10 million
for investment in the project, but to date the PAJ has not accepted this offer.  One
can only speculate that the PAJ wants to have a ‘free hand’ in dealing with the port,
and as such prefers not to enter into any financial arrangements which would
restrict their freedom.
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However, there is a high price to pay for this independence, and the port’s cause
would be much better served by utilising any options available to reduce its debt
burden, which would eventually translate into lower port charges overall and
enhance competitiveness.  To carry this argument to its extreme, the best option
may be to privatise the port completely, going as far as to have it listed on the
vibrant Jamaican Stock Exchange.  However, as one of the few public sector
organisations enjoying a measure of success and providing a constant source of
foreign exchange for the government, it is unlikely that the port will be included in
the government’s privatisation program in the near future.  It is however vitally
important that equity financing rather than loan financing be used to underwrite any
future investment in the port, and that some of its present loan portfolio should be
swapped for equity, in the interest of reducing the present high levels of capital
costs.
On the issue of low productivity, this is tied up with several elements, namely
restrictive practices (again), low domestic cargo volume, and a cumbersome
organisational structure on the port.  Strategies to deal with restrictive practices and
the cumbersome organisational structure on the port will be discussed below as
individual sections.  With respect to low domestic cargo volumes, the fact that at
US$273/move domestic container rates serve to almost subsidise transhipment
container rates of US$116/move is a fact of life in the container industry.  However,
the extent of the disparity between the rates is such that it is the author’s suggestion
that a reduction in the domestic cargo rates may facilitate an increase in trade, by
allowing local businessmen to better exploit present markets and open new ones.
In Jamaica, the cost of transportation and insurance is 14% of the value of
import/exports, which is more than twice as much as the world average rate of 6%
(IMS,1998a,67).  Therefore, there is a lot of room for improvement.  The spin off
effect of increased domestic cargo throughput would enhance not only the port’s
‘bottom line’, but also increase its appeal as a transhipment hub.  More was said on
this subject under section 5.2.3.
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6.1.2 Problems Relating to Labour
A lot has already been said about the existence of restrictive labour practices in the
port resulting in increasing port expenses and low productivity.  In an effort to
remedy the situation, the PAJ and the SAJ jointly commissioned a study in 1997 to
examine the management of labour in the port of Kingston.  This was to be done by
a consultant GR. Collyer, and its findings were to be submitted to a Board of
Enquiry, convened under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour for their perusal.
The membership of this Board was drawn from the ranks of the captains of
Jamaican industry, distinguished members of the Judiciary and elder statesmen of
the trade union movement.  The intention was that their judgements would be
binding on both the management and labour of the port, as it was of the utmost
urgency that a solution be found to the stalemate between them that was slowly
strangling the competitiveness of the port.  The following areas were among the
recommendations submitted to the Board for their consideration :
• Transfer Premium.  It was thought that to pay a docker an additional premium if
he is transferred within his shift to work on another vessel was unreasonable,
and was a practice that existed only in Jamaica.  This is against the background
that he was already guaranteed his pay for the entire shift, as well as guaranteed
to be paid if there was no work, so as long as there was work to be done, he
should not have to be paid extra to do it.
• Night Shift Premium.  Workers on the 2100-0500 hours night shift were paid a
premium rate 20% higher than the regular day shift rate, as well as given the
next two shifts off with pay.  Again, this was considered excessive, and the shift
premium should be eliminated, as the time off with pay given afterwards was
compensation enough.
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• Weekend Premium.  The fixing of Saturday and Sunday as premium time days
which attracted double-time rates was proving to be a disincentive to lines, since
they could not be reasonably expected to revise their schedule around this.  In
keeping with most world ports, it was suggested that this be replaced by a
regime of working any five of seven days before overtime became applicable.
• Flexi-start times.  The present inflexibility of the start times in Kingston were
resulting in shipping lines being forced to absorb huge dead time and overtime
charges, as in most instances they were anxious to commence operations
immediately upon arrival in order to expedite vessel turnaround.  In order to
come in line with the practices of competing ports, it was essential for Kingston
to introduce a degree of flexibility into their shift system.
• Gang Size Reduction.  Despite the onset of containerisation and unitisation of
cargo, Kingston still retains gang sizes of impressive proportions.  As much as
twenty men are assigned to a gang, which carries significant implications in high
labour costs.  When compared to manning levels in other world ports of between
5-7 men per gang, the disadvantages of this practice becomes obvious.
 
 There remain many other outdated and restrictive practices in the port, of which the
above mentioned are just examples.  Preliminary estimates of the possible cost
savings which could be achieved if this exercise is successfully completed and
implemented amount to approximately US$2 million per annum, which could make a
significant contribution towards making the port more price competitive.  The Board
of Enquiry is carrying out its duties by investigating each instance of possible
redundancy in labour practices, and it is anticipated that the results of their
deliberations will go a far way in reducing cost and reforming the labour regime in
the port, making it more relevant to the modern maritime industry.  It is therefore the
author’s viewpoint that this exercise should be expedited as a matter of extreme
urgency, as its potential benefits outweigh any possible dislocations that it may
cause.
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 As part of the initiatives being taken to address the labour-related problems in the
port, it is essential that the question of under-utilisation of the present labour pool be
dealt with.  The port of Kingston presently maintains a pool of approximately 400 full
time dockworkers under the auspices of the SAJ, but in recent times this amount
has been proving to be greater than the current requirements of the port dictates.
This situation is a result of the number of dockworkers being maintained at levels
commensurate with gang sizes which obtained in the era before unitisation of cargo.
There had been no substantial change in hiring policy to reflect the reduced labour
requirements brought on by containerisation and such, mostly due to the SAJ taking
the path of least resistance when faced with the limitations of restrictive practices
and the refusal of trade unions to discuss the reduction of manning levels.  The
consequence of this inaction is the present situation of the SAJ having to carry an
ageing labour force for which there is not sufficient work.  The cost of paying these
workers (based on the guaranteed pay provisions of their union contract) has
resulted in the SAJ running a financial deficit since 1996 (A. Henry,1997,2).
 
 In an effort to rid itself of this untenable situation, the SAJ has undertaken programs
wherein it seeks to rationalise its workforce through offering dockworkers early
retirement and voluntary redundancy options.  It will attempt to make the remaining
workers more efficient by training them to become multi-skilled.  In the author’s
opinion, whereas this will alleviate much of the problem in the short term, the long
term solution would be to eliminate the SAJ’s role as the sponsor of the labour pool
entirely and go the route of several prominent European ports (such as Le Havre in
France) and make the dockworkers be affiliated directly to the stevedoring
companies that use their services.  This would not only eliminate some of the SAJ’s
involvement in what is already a port burdened with complex organisational
relationships, but also facilitate a closer, loyalty-based working relationship between
the dock labour and the stevedoring companies, to the ultimate benefit of the
shipping lines.
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 Finally, also of critical importance in stabilising Kingston’s labour scene, is the
necessity to negate the threat of an unstable labour platform.  As mentioned in
section 5.4.5, Kingston’s waterfront has several strong labour unions (BITU, TUC,
UPSU) involved in the representation of dockworkers.  This situation has several
problems inherent in it, as the achieving of common objectives becomes
increasingly difficult when more players are involved.  In order to establish a truly
collective bargaining unit where personal agendas are secondary to the interests of
the port, it is the view of the author that the management of the port will have to
make a substantial investment in the trade union leadership.  This investment will
have to take the form of holding extensive discussions with the union management
geared towards building trust and forming a common understanding as to the future
plans of the port.  Another necessity would be the sponsoring of seminars, overseas
port visits and any other forums which will result in the exposure of these men to the
current developments taking place in the maritime sector, so that they can be made
to appreciate the need for change as a prerequisite to survival of the port.
 
 6.1.3 Problems Relating to Marketing
 
 Since the inception of the Kingston Container Terminal, it was agreed that the
responsibility for marketing the port would remain with the Port Authority, which was
considered to have the necessary human, financial and political resources to carry it
out.  Whereas the PAJ has achieved some measure of success in this area, as
illustrated by the growth in container traffic handled by the port, there are concerns
that because the PAJ’s marketing department has wider responsibilities for all the
ports and terminals in Jamaica (including cruise ship terminals, specialised dry bulk
terminals and freezones), that there was not enough focus placed on the specific
needs of the container terminal.
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 According to Rosie Donaldson, Vice President of International Marketing in the PAJ,
the marketing program for the port comprises mainly of keeping close personal
contacts with top management of the shipping lines that call the port.  It is through
this medium that it was possible to ‘keep one’s finger on the pulse of the industry’
and thus be able to be forewarned of developments which may have implications for
the port.  Remedial steps could then be taken.  This strategy took the form of
paying annual visits to principals in their headquarters to discuss matters of mutual
interest, and have become so established that even in situations where there has
been a ‘parting of the ways’ so to speak, the traditions continue regardless.  An
example of this approach and the dividends that it can pay is the situation
surrounding Evergreen line and its decision to establish its own relay terminal in
Coco Solo, Panama.  The working relationship between Evergreen and Kingston
has always been good, with the exception of the period in the late 1980’s when they
withdrew their services because of concerns over drug trafficking.  In fact,
Evergreen were accorded the honour of theirs being the first vessel to call at the
new Gordon Quay development, using one of their newest, largest vessels, which
was on her maiden voyage.  When Evergreen left the port of Kingston in 1997 to
commence operations in their Coco Solo hub, the PAJ continued to maintain close
contact with them regardless, hosting an annual Christmas luncheon in New York in
their honour as was the custom.  As it turned out, when Evergreen started
experiencing operational problems in their new hub, the invitation inherent in the
PAJ’s promotional gestures made it easier for Evergreen to decide to return their
westbound RTW service to Kingston pending the resolving of Panama’s teething
problems.
 
 Besides these annual visits, the PAJ also organises special promotional tours,
wherein delegations are sent to visit potential customers in order to acquaint them
with Kingston’s potential.
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 The PAJ’s marketing efforts also include participation in several prominent industry
trade fairs and conferences, such as the annual Latin Ports Conference as well as
the Miami Conference in October and December respectively, and the semi-annual
CSA Conferences in June and October.  Beyond this, there is also a program of
placing advertisements in prominent trade journals (such as Containerisation
International).
 
 In the face of criticisms levelled at them that they have not been paying enough
attention to the promotional needs of the port, the PAJ seems to have countered by
making an effort to increase their marketing intelligence.  An indication of this is the
participation of Ms. Donaldson in the recently concluded Port Marketing Seminar
jointly organised by WMU and the Port of Hamburg.  This seems to be part of a
conscious effort to refine their marketing approach from a ‘shotgun’ to a ‘sniper’
technique, as Ms. Donaldson further hinted at intended efforts to pinpoint and target
shipping alliances and consortia not presently involved in Kingston in an initiative to
increase business and broaden the port’s narrow customer base.  The lines
presently using the port are also being encouraged to increase their presence.
Furthermore, the PAJ is considering the possibility of forming a working alliance
with one of the major global terminal operators in order to strengthen Kingston’s
international profile.
 
 The above mentioned strategies, in the author’s opinion, should go a far way in
alleviating some of the concerns about Kingston’s marketing program. If such
strategies as the specific targeting of major consortia and alliances which presently
have no firm ties in the region (such as COSCO/Yangming and APL/NOL as
mentioned in section 2.2) and forming a working alliance with one of the prominent
global terminal operators (as will be discussed in more detail under opportunities
open to the port) do come into effect, then the marketing efforts are poised to pay
rich dividends.  However the author wishes to point out that Kingston’s marketing
efforts may be better served if a unit was formed, either within the present structure
of the Port Authority itself, or as a department in the KTO management company,
which would specifically concentrate its efforts on the promotion of the container
terminal exclusively.
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 FIGURE 7a.  Port of Kingston : Promotional Material
 Source: PAJ,1997
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 FIGURE 7b.  Port of Kingston : Promotional Material
 Source: PAJ,1997
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 As an illustration of this point, it is interesting to note that in the promotional material
presently available about the port (figures 7a and 7b), only passing reference is
made to some of its greater strengths, such as abundant berthing and storage
space.  This oversight would certainly have been picked up by a dedicated
marketing department.
 
 6.1.4 Problems Relating to Organisational Structure
 
 The rationalisation of the port of Kingston from a splintered entity into one
synchronised operating unit has been an issue on the port’s agenda since shortly
after the container terminal’s inception in 1975.  The inauguration of the Kingston
Container Terminal initially involved a significant degree of co-operation by the
major players on the Kingston Waterfront.  The Port Authority of Jamaica,
representing the government’s interest, agreed to undertake the construction and
retain the ownership of the infrastructure, being Berths 10 and 11, as well as
finance the superstructure.  Recognising its lack of experience in the area of
terminal management, the PAJ agreed that the terminal should be managed under
a joint venture arrangement by the two major wharf companies in the port at the
time, namely Western Terminals (which owned berths 1-4) and Kingston Wharves
(which owned berths 5-9).  This arrangement was made more substantial by the
fact that KWL’s berths 8 and 9 were to be joined with berths 10 and 11 at no cost to
the PAJ and operated as part of the container terminal.  This arrangement
continued from 1975 up until 1979, when the Kingston Container Terminal was
made autonomous, and a new management company named Kingston Terminal
Operators was formed to manage the port under a special contract.  KTO was at
the time jointly owned by Kingston Wharves and Western Terminals.  Stevedoring
supervision for the facility was provided by another new company named Terminal
Services Limited (TSL), while dock labour would be drawn from the labour pool
administered by the SAJ.
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 These arrangements had a large element of political expediency involved in them.
For instance, the contractual management of the new container terminal by the
principal wharf companies was not only to capitalise on their expertise, but also
served as a concession for the business they lost to the container terminal with the
diversion of all their container traffic to the facility.  As to the formation of the new
stevedoring company TSL, this made sense from an operational standpoint, so that
only one entity would be responsible for all stevedoring supervision on the terminal
and enhance the ‘unity of command’ aspect of the terminal’s operations.  However,
in order to compensate the existing stevedoring companies for their loss of
business, they became shareholders in TSL, each according to the estimated extent
of their loss.
 
 In 1994 Kingston Wharves acquired Western Terminals to form the port’s largest
single public wharf company.  This made KWL solely responsible for the
management company KTO, and was a major step in the direction of total
rationalisation of the port of Kingston.  However, by this time, relations between the
PAJ and the private sector were becoming increasingly strained, to the point that
although the original management contract had expired in 1987, it had not been
officially renewed, and as such the terminal was being run on a gentleman’s
agreement.  One of the reasons that the relationship deteriorated was that the PAJ
was becoming increasingly suspicious that because the management company
KTO was owned by KWL, who had a container-handling facility of their own, there
was a conflict of interest.  The PAJ was therefore not convinced that their best
interests were being protected at all times, especially since some amount of
competition had developed between the Container Terminal and Kingston Wharves
(which by this time had developed into a multi-purpose terminal) for container
business. KWL had developed container traffic to the tune of 87,000TEU in 1997,
which constituted over 70% of its cargo throughput.  With the development of
Gordon Quay in 1996, the PAJ took the position that in order to justify the
investment, all container traffic should be diverted to the Container Terminal.
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 Of course, KWL was not in agreement with this suggestion, unwilling to be
relegated to handling dwindling breakbulk and ro-ro traffic.  They did however offer
to invest US$10 million in Gordon Quay, but the PAJ has not as yet accepted the
offer.  As a matter of fact, the PAJ has increasingly adopted an attitude of ‘wanting
to go it alone’.
 
 It seems that after twenty years of being a tool port, the PAJ are of the mind to now
become a service port, figuring that they have learnt enough to do it themselves.
This thinking is reflected in the fact that they ‘fired’ Terminal Services Limited in
1998, and have assumed total responsibility for stevedoring supervision
themselves, and in the reticence they have shown towards renewing KTO’s
management contract.  Unsure of its position, KWL has embarked upon a US$30
million expansion programme of its own, geared towards improving its capabilities
as a multi-purpose facility and place it in a position to better hold its own against the
container terminal.
 
 When the SAJ, which is struggling to maintain its relevance as the manager of the
labour pool, and the labour unions, which are also pursuing their individual agendas,
are added to the mix, one can see how complex the relationships existing on the
port of Kingston can become.
 
 This internal wrangling in the port of Kingston does nothing to promote the
advancement of the port, especially in light of the serious external competition it
faces.  It is the considered opinion of the author that it is of paramount importance
that the parties concerned reconcile their differences and focus human and capital
resources in a streamlined effort to advance the cause of the port as a premier
transhipment hub.  All is not lost, as discussions are still ongoing, but time grows
increasingly short while we wait for a breakthrough in negotiations which will
establish a ‘blueprint’ to guide the future development of the port.
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 6.2 OPPORTUNITIES
 
 As mentioned during the SWOT analysis in chapter 5, the opportunities open to the
port of Kingston are being discussed here as part of the proposals for the continued
survival of the port in the face of globalisation.  It will be found that measures to
counter some of the threats discussed under section 5.4 will be covered here as we
seek to turn these threats into opportunities.
 
 6.2.1 Development Of A Key Regional Transhipment ‘Hub’ Centre
 
 In this context, the overriding opportunity open to the port of Kingston is to develop
into the key hub centre for the region.  This would also effectively deal with the
threat of growing competition from other regional ports, for although all market
projections indicate the steady increase in regional container volumes (refer section
3.3), it is imperative that Kingston retains, if not improve, its market share.  It could
achieve this status by taking the following steps:
 
• develop and implement realistic marketing strategies, with identifiable target
accounts and specific deadlines
• develop a competitively priced tariff, which should be all inclusive, without a
‘grocery list’ of additional surcharges, extras and dead time penalties
• enhance this tariff by working with dedicated feeder operators to provide a
schedule of rates covering movement of transhipment containers from arrival in
Kingston to delivery at port of destination and vice versa
• develop joint venture relationships with the region’s secondary ports, including
linked tariff charges
• develop added value services, and effectively become the regional transportation
partner of the container carriers.  Such services might include container logistics
and repairs, groupage and delivery activities, container storage, etc.
83
 6.2.2 Growth of Domestic Import/Export Market
 
 Traditionally, domestic cargo movements, because of their captive nature, have
always been made to pay a considerably higher charge than transhipment boxes.
Kingston is no exception, with domestic rates running at US$ 273 compared to
transhipment rates of US$ 116 per unit.  Furthermore, the cost of transportation and
insurance as a percentage of the value of import/exports has been determined to be
about 14% in the case of Jamaica.  This compares negatively with average rates of
6% in the world, and 8% in Latin America and the Caribbean (IMS,1998b,66).
 
 The opportunity here is if the overall cost of transportation could be reduced, then
the lower rates could stimulate export growth, as well as lead to the sourcing of
imports from different overseas markets.  The resulting increase in domestic traffic
will carry significant spin-off benefits for the port.
 
 6.2.3 Development of Additional Products
 
 In the present environment of cut-throat competition, ocean carriers remain
committed to a port only as long as it is expedient.  Loyalty has become a luxury
they can no longer afford.  It is therefore up to the ports to enhance their basic
services to the point where they become such an integral part of the carriers’
operations, that the decision to switch becomes much more difficult.
 
 The formation of joint ventures with feeder services and secondary ports, as
mentioned in section 6.2.1, is one such strategy worthy of consideration.  Providing
a ready-made network of transhipment connections at competitive rates is a service
few carriers would not find attractive.
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 Another tactic could be to develop depots for repair and long term storage of empty
containers.  This is feasible in light of the abundant space and labour supply on
hand in Kingston, especially in comparison to similar facilities existing on far more
expensive real estate in North America.
 
 The main point in the development of additional products is that it should match the
resources of the port with the requirements of the carriers in order to come up with
customised portfolios for each customer.  Providing an array of tailor-made services
will certainly strengthen the tenuous grip the terminal has on its clientele.
 
 6.2.4 Leasing Terminal Facilities
 
 Given the recent expansion of the port through the ongoing Gordon Quay project,
the port’s management may be able to consider the possibility of establishing
dedicated terminals for major users, like Zim/ZIAS or NCS.  This is against the
background of Maersk/Sea-Land redirecting their traffic through a dedicated
terminal in Rio Haina, and Evergreen moving its transhipment operations to its own
terminal in Manzanillo.  Given this trend, it may be prudent for Kingston to overlook
any loss of ‘independence’ and offer part of its facilities conditionally to the highest
bidder, guaranteeing sustainable development and steady income.
 
 6.2.5 Alliance with Global Terminal Operators
 
 As introduced in section 2.3, another significant trend developing in the maritime
industry is the emergence of global terminal operators or superport companies.
These are terminal operators, port authorities and shipping lines extending their
influence and container handling expertise into the international arena by forming
networks of strategic hub terminals world-wide.
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 The face of Kingston’s regional competition has been changed by the entrance of
these players, with such developments as Hutchinson Port Holdings involvement in
Freeport, Christobal & Balboa and Stevedoring Services of America’s joint venture
in Manzanillo.  These relationships were discussed in greater detail in section 5.4.2
as part of the threats in the SWOT analysis.  However, it should be mentioned here
that forming a working alliance with a member of this superclub would give Kingston
immediate access to human, capital and technical resources which would
tremendously enhance its credibility and standing in the international maritime
community.  Given the affiliations which already exist in the region, of the major
players, the following organisations are open to approach :
 
• Port of Singapore (PSA Corporation)
• Port of Hamburg (HHLA)
• P&O Ports
• ICTSI
These players are all very aggressive in their quest for compatible sites, as they
seek to become diversified enough to offer a range of global facilities to the mega
consortia, and thereby become their fully integrated partners in the transportation
process.
In the event that Kingston was unable to form any sort of an alliance with one of the
superport companies, they should instead pursue the angle of forming working
alliances with other independent terminal operators like themselves.  By forming
themselves into a network of strategically located hub ports, these independent
operators could put themselves in a position to better meet the threat posed by
global operators.  A place to start could be with ports affiliated to cities with which
Kingston already has significant civic, diplomatic and bilateral aid through the
‘twinning of cities’ program.
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In closing, some specific observations pertaining to the situation of the port of
Kingston will be made, followed by the author’s recommendations as to how to deal
with the challenges posed by these circumstances.
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
7.1.1 Global Trends
With regards to changes in patterns of trade, initially, the East-West trade routes
lost some relevance to Kingston due to the introduction of post-Panamax vessels on
the route, causing most of the trade to bypass the Panama canal.  However,
substantial growth in regional trade volume, coupled with increasing levels of
containerisation (especially in Central American, Venezuelan and Colombian ports),
has resulted in the regional container market expanding steadily.  All ports in the
region are expected to experience increased container traffic, and furthermore, the
Caribbean is expected to increase its market share in the region from 35% at
present to 38% by the year 2005.  The port of Kingston should ultimately therefore,
not be adversely affected by changes in trade patterns.
On the other hand however, changes in liner shipping organisation do pose a
significant threat to Kingston.  The displacement of liner conferences by consortia
and alliances, and the alarming frequency with which these groupings rearrange
themselves, places the port in the unfortunate position of having to be constantly
vigilant of the many changes that take place in this arena.  With the growth of
consortia and alliances, the stakes have become much larger, because the sheer
volume of business that a major consortia brings in is extremely valuable to a port,
business it can ill afford to lose.  Because of this, the terminal becomes vulnerable
both in terms of pressure from competitors vying for the same business, and
pressure from this major customer to cut rates.
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Kingston has suffered on both these counts, having lost Maersk/Sea-Land to Rio
Haina and having to grant tariff concessions to ZIM/ZIAS.  Although Kingston has
benefited from the formation of alliances (e.g. NCS Eurosal), it must remain very
wary of this global trend and be prepared to do what is necessary to respond.
Another global trend of which the port of Kingston must be wary is the development
of global terminal operators.  These superport companies pose a grave threat to
Kingston in its present state as an independent regional operator, because of the
tremendous human, technological and financial resources they have at their
disposal.  Because these global operators can use their international connections to
outbid, outmanoeuvre and outperform local ports, they make formidable opponents.
To make matters worse, they seem to have taken a particular interest in the
Caribbean region, as the extent of their involvement outlined in section 5.4.2 will
corroborate.  The management of the port of Kingston would be well advised to pay
very close attention to this development.
With regards to the trending upwards of the number and size of containerships,
Kingston has some cause for concern.  Even though its deep water harbour and
well developed container handling facility can handle all but the latest generation of
containerships, the displacement of post-Panamax tonnage into the north-south
trades has resulted in many of the mainliners serving the region being unable to
transit the Panama canal.  Coupled with the use of double stacked trains on the
USWC - USEC landbridge, this development has resulted in the diversion of much
container trade from the trade routes passing Kingston to or from the canal, and
deprived the port of possible transhipment business.  Although adversely affected in
this respect, there is a positive side effect of increasing vessel size, which is the
preference of large container-carrier operators for the hub and spoke concept of
distribution.
88
The increasing popularity of the hub and spoke concept works to Kingston’s
advantage, since it is naturally suited to serve as the hub centre for the region.  For
the same reason, the growing preference shown by shipping lines for pendulum
type services over the RTW service structure can also benefit Kingston.  Although
the Kingston Container Terminal is presently the hub for both Zim and Evergreen’s
RTW services, the shift to pendulum services by other carriers will not necessarily
hurt it, because it is still well positioned to serve as the regional hub for any line that
wants to extend their pendulum network into the Caribbean.  This is so because its
major competitors (e.g. Panama) are too far west for these vessels, which would
not be transiting the canal.
Finally, with respect to developments in cargo handling techniques, the port of
Kingston can hold its own on the international stage due to its investment in state of
the art ship-to-shore, yard handling, MIS and IT systems.  The use of automation is
significant, but not prevalent in Kingston.  This does not necessarily mean that they
are worse off than European ports (for example), since one of the prime reasons for
the increasing use of automation is to reduce manpower costs, which for Kingston is
still relatively cheap.  This is as opposed to the cost of capital, which is extremely
high.  Thus, an optimum balance has to be struck between the two.
7.1.2 Local Shipping Industry
The shipping industry in Jamaica actually comprises over 70 public and private
sector organisations, of which the PAJ, SAJ, KTO, KWL are the major players in
that they are largely responsible for the industry’s development.  The relationships
between these organisations are close and complex, as outlined in section 3.1, and
in recent times have been growing increasingly strained and tense.  This does not
auger well for the industry’s immediate future, because although intra-port
competition can be healthy up to a point, the in-fighting could prove a distraction in
the face of the global threats now confronting the port.
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As far as Jamaica’s domestic cargo market is concerned, its prospects for growth
are not good, due to the high level of containerisation already existing in the port,
and the below par local GDP growth performance.  As such, the present and future
expansion of the port will have to be fuelled by growth in transhipment traffic.
Fortunately, the prognosis for regional transhipment cargoes is extremely positive,
to the extent that even if Kingston should suffer a decline in regional market share
from 33% at present to 27% in year 2005, it would still experience a 57% increase
in transhipment traffic, moving from 0.46 up to 1.1 million TEUs.  This is however no
reason for the management of the port to become complacent, and every measure
should be taken to preserve, if not improve, its market share.
7.1.3 Port Productivity Indicators
In terms of physical characteristics, the port of Kingston compares favourably with
both regional and international standards.  As a matter of fact, in terms of
throughput it is the fourth ranked port in the Caribbean region (behind Miami, Port
Everglades and San Juan) and among the top 100 ports in the world, having
steadily improved its ranking over the past 10 years.
With respect to productivity, Kingston has consistently performed in line with
international standards.  Its 1996 TEU per berth kilometre rate of 0.39 million is
higher than all other port ranges except NE Asia, and is actually an optimum
balance between added capacity and vessel activity, as history shows that it can
perform at much higher levels.  Its TEU per gantry crane productivity of 60,400 in
1996 was marginally lower than that of other port ranges, and actually also reflected
newly added capacity.  As such, it also compares very favourably.
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At a rated performance of 24 container moves per hour, and a berth occupancy rate
of between 50-55%, the port of Kingston has established standards acceptable to
all but the most demanding shipping lines.  Overall, as far as productivity measures
are concerned, the port of Kingston can be considered to be globally competitive.
In terms of domestic cargo rates, Kingston is admittedly expensive.  At US$ 273 per
move, Kingston’s importers/exporters pay one of the highest prices in the region,
and virtually subsidise the transhipment rate of US$ 116.  On the other hand, this
transhipment rate is very competitive not only in the region, but globally, undercut by
only North European and Middle Eastern ports.  Not being privy to the financial
details of KTO’s costs, on the surface it seems that it may be a good idea to reduce
the domestic container rates in order to stimulate more local business, while holding
the transhipment rate at the present level for the duration, at least until global
competitive forces dictate that they should trend downwards to North European
levels.
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
There is no question that the port of Kingston finds itself in a difficult situation,
confronted as it is by global changes.  In this concluding section, the author will
make recommendations and propose strategies how the port of Kingston can
capitalise on its strengths, and turn some of its threats into opportunities:
• The problem of relatively high terminal costs should be addressed by
implementing strategies to reduce the high capital cost burden presently being
carried by the port.  Efforts to swap some of this debt in favour of equity
financing should be made immediately.  Furthermore, any future expansion of
the port should be financed by equity rather than loans.  Finally the eventual
privatisation of the port through the making of a public share offer on the
Jamaican Stock Exchange should be explored as early as possible.
• The issue of low domestic cargo volumes should be tackled by introducing a
reduction in domestic cargo handling rates, possibly up to around 20%, in order
to stimulate import/export trade.
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• On the labour front, the following actions need to be taken:
a) The present revision of restrictive practices on the port should be
expedited, and changes implemented as early as possible.
b) The present labour pool should be downsized to appropriate levels
through a program of early retirement and voluntary redundancy.  The
remaining dockworkers should be trained to become multi-skilled in order
to increase their efficiency levels.
c) The role of the SAJ as the manager of the labour pool should be reduced,
if not eliminated, and dockworkers should be assigned directly to
stevedoring companies, who would become responsible for them.
d) The management of the port need to make an investment of time, effort
and money in the leadership of the trade unions in order to build trust and
facilitate understanding of the changes that the unions need to
accommodate for the continued well-being of the port.
• Kingston’s main natural advantages of location and deep water harbour are in
danger of being eclipsed.  However, by coupling it with its modern terminal
facilities and abundant capacity, this package should be marketed aggressively
to the international shipping fraternity in order to re-establish the port’s pre-
eminence as an ideal transhipment point.
• Furthermore, with regards to marketing, a dedicated marketing unit should be
created, either within the existing PAJ structure or as a department of KTO, for
the express purpose of promoting the port.  Strategies such as targeting of lines
and consortias not presently using the port, encouragement of present users to
increase their business and formation of alliances with other port operators could
then be pursued more single-mindedly.
• The total rationalisation of the port of Kingston into a unified operating structure
needs to be realised quickly, so that the port can adopt a holistic approach to its
future development and strategic planning.  Urgent measures need to be taken
to resolve the growing impasse between the PAJ and the KWL, which has stalled
this process, which made tremendous gains with the merger of Western
Terminals and Kingston Wharves.  This deadlock could be broken if:
 (a) The continued management of the container terminal by the private
sector (through KTO) was confirmed by renewal of the contract and
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 (b) the private sector was given a greater role in the terminal by being
allowed to invest in it substantially.
 This would alleviate some of their present concerns about being ‘shut out’
completely and being forced to compete head-on with the PAJ.  They could
therefore then throw their full support behind the container terminal.
• The opportunity should be seized to develop the port into a key regional
transhipment hub.  This could be accomplished through the following means:
 (a) develop and implement realistic marketing strategies, with identifiable
target accounts and specific deadlines.
 (b) develop a competitively priced all-inclusive tariff, which should be
enhanced by the inclusion of freight rates from feeder operators and
handling rates from secondary origin/destination ports, covering the total
movement of transhipment containers.
 (c) develop value added services.
• The abundant space and additional capacity resulting from the recent Gordon
Quay expansion should be offered to major customers of the port under lease
arrangements as dedicated terminals, increasing their commitment to the port.
• Efforts should be made to form a working alliance with a major global terminal
operator.  Failing that, initiatives should be taken to establish a network of
working alliances with other independent terminals located throughout the world
in key regional areas.
Given the implementation of these suggestions, the port of Kingston would be well
prepared to face the challenges posed by a rapidly changing world.
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APPENDICES
